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"Compelled Consent": An Oxymoron with Sinister
Consequences for Citizens Who Patronize
Foreign Banking Institutions
Harvey M. Silets* and Susan W. Brenner**
I. INTRODUCTION
T Article analyzes an increasingly sensitive issue in federal criminalprocedure: the use of "compelled consents" to produce foreign bank-
ing and professional relationship records.1 The context in which the is-
sue arises is best illustrated by a well-known decision in this area, United
States v. Ghidoni:2
Ghidoni [was indicted on] four counts of willful tax evasion, in
violation of 26 U.S.C. section 7206(1). The indictment alleged that
Ghidoni, . . . [had] engaged in a scheme whereby income .. . was
diverted to... [a] [b]ank... in the Cayman Islands. The allegedly
diverted income was not reported on . . . tax returns for those
years.... Ghidoni maintain[ed] that [he did not] ... control any
* Harvey M. Silets is a founding partner of the Chicago law firm of Silets and Martin, Ltd.,
with a practice concentrated in the area of taxation and white-collar crime. Mr. Silets served as the
Chief Tax Attorney in the office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois
before entering private practice. He was a member of the Advisory Committee on Tax Litigation of
the Tax Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and is the Chairman of the Committee on the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure of the American College of Trial Lawyers. Mr. Silets has
authored a number of articles on tax matters, including criminal tax issues. He is a Fellow of the
American College of Tax Counsel, a Fellow of the International Academy of Trial Lawyers, a Fel-
low of the American College of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and is an Adjunct Professor of Taxation
at the Chicago-Kent College of Law.
** Susan W. Brenner is now an Assistant Professor at the University of Dayton School of Law;
until recently, she was an associate with the firm of Silets and Martin, Ltd. She received her J.D.
from Indiana University in 1981, taught at the Indiana University Law School for two years and
clerked for a federal judge who sits in northern Indiana. She has graduate degrees in sociology and,
prior to attending law school, taught sociology at the undergraduate and graduate levels, specializing
in criminology. She has authored a number of law review articles on various issues in criminal law
and criminal sanctions.
I See, eg., 1st Circuit Rejects "Compelled Consent", Nat'l L.J., Apr. 20, 1987, at 9, col. 1;
Secord Says Access to Bank Records Violates Constitution, Washington News/UPI, Apr. 7, 1987
(available on NEXIS); Hiding Money Gets Tougher, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 3, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Bank-
Record Disclosure Ordered, Nat'l L. J. Sept. 22, 1986, at 8, col. 1; Foreign Banks Don't Have to Turn
Over Records, Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA)--Legal Briefs, (May 27, 1985), at 926.
2 732 F.2d 814 (1lth Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984). See also infra pt. III(B)(1).
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Cayman Island bank accounts and that distributions to him from ac-
counts there were loans from former clients.
In furtherance of its investigation, the government issued a sub-
poena to the Miami, Florida, branch of the [blank ... commanding
production of bank records relating to Ghidoni's accounts.... [Blank
officials expressed concern that production of these records would sub-
ject bank employees to criminal liability under the Confidential Rela-
tionships (Preservation) Law of the Cayman Islands. The bank
suggested that problems with the Cayman Island law could be avoided
if Ghidoni would execute a directive consenting to disclosure.
3
... Ghidoni refused [to execute the consent directive], arguing
that compelled execution of the directive would violate his right
against self-incrimination. The district court rejected the claim and
found Ghidoni in contempt.4
Other courts have disagreed, holding that the execution of consent direc-
tives, or "compelled consents," violates the fifth amendment prohibition
against compulsory self-incrimination. 5
This Article explores the dissonance which characterizes the case
law in this area and presents a functional analysis of the incriminatory
aspects of "compelled consents." This apparent dissonance can be re-
solved and a general principle is available for implementing fifth amend-
ment guarantees in extraterritorial discovery.
Part II describes several foreign bank secrecy statutes and examines
the considerations that have provided the occasion for the development
and implementation of compelled consents. Part III traces the evolution
of these consents and analyzes the decisional law that has tempered their
use. Part IV considers the argument that such consents violate constitu-
tional guarantees against self-incrimination; a proposal reconciles the ap-
parently inconsistent positions that certain federal courts have taken with
3 Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 816 (footnote omitted).
One of the tactics frequently used by law enforcement agencies of the [U.S.] govern-
ment for obtaining information held by banks in other countries where bank secrecy laws
exist is the "consent directive." A consent directive is a statement signed by a party under
investigation pursuant to a court order that purports to grant consent to the disclosure of
financial information to government officials.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 319 (V. Nanda
& M. Bassiouni eds. 1986) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW]. See also infra pt. II(B)
(for a further discussion of the Cayman Islands statute which was at issue in Ghidoni).
4 732 F.2d at 816 (rhe Eleventh Circuit affirmed the contempt citation.). See infra pt. mI(B).
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, . . . nor shall [he] be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...." (emphasis added)). See, eg.,
Senate Select Committee v. Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562 (1987). See also infra pt. IV(B) (for a more
thorough discussion of this matter).
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respect to this issue. Finally, Part V presents a brief conclusion summa-
rizing the points which have been presented in preceding sections.
II. "INFORMATION HAVENS:" THE RATIONALE FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
"COMPELLED CONSENTS"
[Many foreign nations have enacted legislation that prohibits the pro-
duction of documents from their jurisdictions for any proceeding in a
foreign nation. Since these statutes commonly attach a criminal pen-
alty to violations, American Courts are confronted with the possibility
that enforcement of their discovery orders will lead to criminal liability
for the producing company.6
Although the above-quoted passage describes issues that arise in the
context of civil discovery, its description is equally pertinent to criminal
discovery. In recent years, the U.S. government has encountered ex-
treme difficulties in securing the production of documents,7 the examina-
6 Note, Strict Enforcement of Extraterritorial Discovery, 38 STAN. L. REv. 841 (1986) (foot-
notes omitted) [hereinafter Note, Strict Enforcement].
Increased interaction among citizens of different countries has resulted in the growing
need to obtain information from other countries. Over the last few years, the United States
has increasingly sought to recover information held in other countries regarding criminal
matters by the use of subpoenas. Subpoenas issued by [U.S.] courts and government agen-
cies have often met with resistance in foreign countries, particularly in countries that have
'bank secrecy or blocking statutes.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 301.
7 See C. BLAU, A. RUDNICK, R. MARKLEY, J. MARRERO, J. JARVEY & H. GREENWALD,
INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF ILLEGAL MONEY LAUNDERING: A GUIDE TO THE BANK
SECRECY ACT 4 (1983) [hereinafter BLAU & RUDNICK].
Banks located in ... so-called "secrecy jurisdictions" cannot disclose any information
found in their customers' bank accounts. Because unauthorized disclosures of information
in their customers' accounts may subject these banks to criminal liability abroad, foreign
banks usually have not assisted [U.S.] law enforcement agencies in their investigations of
criminals and tax and regulatory violators who use secret foreign accounts to facilitate
illegal activity or hide ill-gotten profits.
Id. The text continues with following observations:
During the late 1960s, the [U.S.] government became increasingly concerned about
the use of secret bank accounts by Americans engaged in illegal activity. Reports revealed
that these bank accounts were frequently used to:
(1) evade capital gains tax on securities transactions;
(2) manipulate United States securities markets;
(3) violate rules on insider trading;
(4) trade in gold;
(5) act as a depository for money obtained from illegal activity; and
(6) bring money from illegal sources back into the United States as clean money loans.
The foreign bank secrecy laws soon were recognized as a major impediment to the
prevention and detection of these illegal activities. This fact became more evident as at-
tempts by the U.S. government to prosecute tax and security regulation violators who uti-
lized foreign bank accounts were increasingly hampered. The prosecution of drug
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tion of which is deemed essential for the course and conduct of various
criminal investigations.8
The primary difficulty has involved attempts to gain access to for-
eign banking records.9 Lawmakers and law enforcement personnel have
concluded that the intransignece of foreign banking institutions has prox-
imately contributed to the growth and prosperity of various types of
criminal activity.1° "The effect has been to systematically obstruct U.S.
traffickers and other criminals who used foreign accounts to hide or launder their ill-gotten
gains also were frustrated by foreign secrecy laws.
Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted) (citing S. REP. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1970).
8 See, eg., Hearings on International Tax Administration Before the Subcommittee on Com-
merce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the House Committee on Government Operations, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (statement of Michael C. Durney, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Tax
Division, Department of Justice) [hereinafter Durney Statement]; Olsen, Discovery in Federal Crimi-
nal Investigations, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 999 (1984); Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore
Banks and Companies, S. REP. No. 99-130, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter SENATE RE-
PORT]; BLAU & RUDNICK, supra note 7.
9 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
In 1982, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) began examining the
criminal exploitation of offshore tax havens, through the use of banks, trusts and compa-
nies. The subcommittee's review encompassed the full range of criminal activities, from
those commonly associated with drug trafficking and commodities fraud, to the more unex-
pected use of offshore facilities by American tax protestors.
The subcommittee found that the criminal exploitation of offshore havens is flourish-
ing because of haven secrecy and foreign government intransigence in the face of over-
whelming evidence of dirty money in their banking systems.
Id. Even more frightening is this later report.
A 1983 Joint Economic Committee report estimating that the U.S. "underground econ-
omy" was then hiding $222 billion a year in taxable income from the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), which amounted to 7.5% of our gross national product. The Senate Perma-
nent Subcommittee on Investigations has reported that other estimates of this income con-
cealment range from $150 billion to $600 billion a year. In 1983, the Research Division of
the Internal Revenue Service reported that the 'tax gap' (taxes owed minus taxes received)
grew from $30.9 billion in 1973 to $90.5 billion in 1981. The Dorgan Task Force very
recently reported that the tax gap grew to $103 billion for 1986, and estimated it will grow
to $200 billion by 1992. All research to date on the tax gap clearly indicates that a great
deal of the problem results from [U.S.] taxpayers' use of offshore financial facilities....
By using offshore contrivances, tax evaders capitalize on jurisdictional problems en-
countered by federal tax authorities in attempting to obtain evidence in foreign countries or
retrieving foreign-based assets to satisfy tax obligations.
Durney Statement, supra note 8, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted) (citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at
1-2 and The Dorgan Task Force on Narrowing the $100 Billion Tax Gap (a report by Congressman
Byron L. Dorgan and the Dorgan Task Force (May 1987)), reprinted in 133 CONG. REc. S5,924
(daily ed. May 5, 1987).
1O SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1. A subsequent passage provides some details as to the
nature of the problems generated by the banking laws of these "secrecy jurisdictions":
Senator Roth opened the subcommittee's hearings on the criminal uses of offshore
banks and companies by noting:
What we (PSI) have found... is a problem that is pervasive and growing....
During this investigation and others which the subcommittee has conducted we have
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law enforcement investigations, erode the public's confidence in our
criminal justice system, and thwart the collection of massive amounts of
tax revenues.""
These concerns have resulted in the development and implementa-
tion of "compelled consents." Because this phenomenon cannot be fully
understood without appreciating these concerns and the forces which
produced them, the succeeding portions of this section (a) examine the
banking laws of "secrecy jurisdictions"; (b) analyze the doctrines that
govern the resolution of controversies which arise with respect to "trans-
national discovery"; (c) consider the decisional law generated by efforts
to obtain extraterritorial discovery without the benefit of "compelled
consents"; and (d) describe the considerations which led to the develop-
ment of such consents.
A. "Secrecy Jurisdictions"
The "secrecy jurisdictions" are more commonly referred to as "tax
havens" or "information havens."' 2 A "tax haven" has been defined as
"$any country having a low or zero rate of tax on all or certain categories
of income, and offering a certain amount of banking or commercial se-
crecy.' "13 "Information havens" are "jurisdictions whose laws are in-
tentionally structured so as to attract commerce based on a promise of
secrecy."'
14
Havens generally possess three essential characteristics:
repeatedly heard testimony about major narcotic traffickers and other criminals who use
offshore institutions to launder their ill-gotten profits or to hide them from the Internal
Revenue Service. Haven secrecy laws in an ever increasing number of cases prevent U.S.
law enforcement officials from obtaining the evidence they need to convict U.S. criminals
and recover illegal funds. It would appear that use of offshore haven secrecy laws is the
glue that holds many U.S. criminal operations together.
But equally shocking is the fact that we have also found that offshore havens are no
longer used exclusively by criminals. Instead, they are increasingly being used by other-
wise law abiding Americans to avoid paying taxes and to shield assets from creditors.
Id. at 4 (footnotes omitted).
I1 Id. at 1.
12 See, ag., SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 29-36.
13 Id. at 29 (quoting Gordon, Tax Havens and Their Use by United States Taxpayers-An
Overview (Internal Revenue Service, Jan. 12, 1981)). "Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Ros-
coe L. Egger, Jr. elaborated on Gordon's definition by adding '[m]ost tax havens also possess modem
communication systems, a general lack of currency controls, an aggressive policy of self-promotion,
and no extensive involvement in tax treaties."' Id. See also id. at 33 ("[s]trictly in utilitarian terms,
a tax haven can be defined as any jurisdiction which provides accessible facilities, together with an
infrastructure, and sociopolitical milieu, that are more lucrative (because of secrecy and tax breaks)
than those available in financial communities of other jurisdictions").
14 Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6, at 848 n.32. ('The obvious parallel is to 'tax havens'
whose attraction is in their provision of tax laws that enable companies to avoid tax liability in other
places.").
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(1) favorable tax structures, (2) secrecy concerning business transactions,
and (3) economic sector domination by banks and financial institutions. 5
Havens "compete[ ] economically by attracting foreign investment to
utilize [their] banking facilities and to form offshore companies ...
[T]hrough law and practice, [they]... protect the investments and the
investors from harm or loss inflicted by any foreign country of which
these investors are residents or citizens, or in which they are economi-
cally active."1 6
The laws which havens utilize in this regard
fall into two categories: secrecy and blocking provisions. Secrecy laws
usually involve general confidentiality. They prohibit the disclosure of
business records or the identity of bank customers to a third party.
Blocking laws, on the other hand, are very specific in nature. They
prohibit the disclosure, copying, inspection or removal of documents
located in the territory of the enacting State in compliance with the
production orders of a foreign authority.' 7
15 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 29-30.
A favorable tax structure is an indispensable feature of a tax haven.... Because of
these differing attitudes toward income taxes, most haven jurisdictions do not recognize tax
evasion as a crime and refuse to assist in any investigation of a U.S. citizen suspected of
evasion, even though laundering income through the haven may have been the primary
means of evasion.
The second requirement ... secrecy, refers to the confidentiality given to persons
transacting business-especially with banks. Bank secrecy has important underpinnings in
British common law and has been adopted by virtually all present or former British colo-
nies. Some countries have strengthened and broadened the common law by enacting stat-
utes with the tax haven trade in mind, the unfortunate result of which has been to render
vital information virtually impossible for foreign government investigators to obtain....
A third common characteristic of tax havens is that banks and similar financial insti-
tutions assume a dominant role in the havens' trade and commerce, and those skilled in
financial transactions, such as bankers, lawyers, and accountants constitute a large percent-
age of the haven's professional class.
16 Id. at 33.
17 Id. at 43. See also Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6, at 847-48; RESTATEMENT OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 437 reporters' note I (Tent. Final
Draft No. 2, 1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED)]. Rather
than rely upon the distinction between "secrecy" and "blocking" laws, one author has divided block-
ing laws into three categories: (1) "older laws like the Swiss banking secrecy statutes" which were
not originally enacted in order to block discovery in connection with American litigation, but which
are being used to that effect; (2) "broad discovery preclusion statutes" that "create blanket protec-
tion for large categories of documents and/vest relatively broad discretion over disclosure issues in
some government official"; and (3) laws "such as Canada's Uranium Information Security Regula-
tions [which are] aimed directly at frustrating specific American claims" for discovery. Note, Strict
Enforcement, supra note 6, at 847-48. See also United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1324 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111,
111 (S.D. N.Y. 1981); Comment, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and Reasonableness A Reply to A.V.
Lowe, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 629, 631-36 (1981); Prov. Can. Stat. 1976-2368, CAN. STAT. 0. & REGS.
77-836 (Oct. 13, 1977), in implementation of Atomic Energy Act, 1979, sched. 9, R.S.C. ch. A-19
[hereinafter Prov. Can. Stat.].
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As of 1985, "there [were] more than 15 jurisdictions with secrecy laws
and 16 jurisdictions with blocking laws.""8 Although secrecy and block-
ing laws often achieve identical ends, they tend to derive from rather
different considerations, as is illustrated by the discussion immediately
below.
1. Blocking Laws
Blocking laws result from a "conflict between U.S. legal and en-
forcement policies and the policies promoted by the non-disclosure juris-
dictions." 9 Principally, these blocking jurisdictions disfavor the broad
scope of American pretrial discovery practices.20
18 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 43. See also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW (REVISED), supra note 17.
19 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 44.
20 See 28 U.S.C. section 26(b)(1)(1983); SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 44.
Tihe most important underlying cause of this conflict [has been] a difference in pretrial
discovery practices.
American pretrial discovery rules are far more liberal than their foreign counterparts.
Under U.S. law, a court is permitted to order the production of documents that are inad-
missible at a trial as long as the documents sought appear 'reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.' Most common-law and civil law jurisdictions con-
demn such pretrial investigations as 'fishing expeditions,' permitting only the production of
evidence that would be admissible at trial and allowing for the disclosure of evidence
sought by letters rogatory for criminal matters only after 'commencement' of the proceed-
ings, which has come to mean the issuance of an indictment.... [T]he legislative history of
many of the foreign blocking laws indicates [that] they were enacted in response to
problems allegedly encountered.., as a result of U.S. litigation.
S. SEIDEL, EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 24 (1984) ("[I]n most
common law countries, even England, one must often look hard to find the resemblances between
pretrial discovery there and pretrial discovery in the [United States]. In England, for example,
although document discovery is available, depositions do not exist, interrogatories have strictly lim-
ited use, and discovery of third parties is not generally allowed."). The "difference[s] in pretrial
discovery practices" are the result of very distinct conceptualizations of the nature and function of
discovery:
Two fundamentally divergent notions of judicial process rest at the heart of the con-
flict between the American pretrial discovery process and foreign law. In civil law coun-
tries like France, for instance, the investigatory process of discovery occurs exclusively
under the aegis of the judge. The French reject the suggestion that such a critical function
of the court be entrusted to the parties themselves. Even the British, with a common law
system similar to that of the United States, object to the unequalled breadth of American
discovery practice.
Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6, at 846 (footnotes omitted) (citing J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIl.
TRADITION 11-14 (1985); REPORT MADE IN THE NAME OF THE COMMISSION OF PRODUCTION
AND EXCHANGES (1) ON THE LAW PROJECT ADOPTED BY THE SENATE RELATING TO THE COM-
MUNICATION OF DOCUMENTS AND INFORMATION OF ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL OR TECHNICAL
NATURE TO FOREIGN PHYSICAL PERSONS OR COMPANIES, No. 1814, at 11-15 (1980); Borel &
Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in France for Use in Litigation in the
United States, 13 INT'L LAw. 35, 36 (1979); Collins, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining
Evidence in England for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 27 (1979)). See also
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France and England are among the jurisdictions that have enacted
blocking legislation. The French statute renders it illegal for any French
national to disclose economic or national security information to foreign-
ers. The law requires any French national, approached with a request for
such information, to inform the French government of the request.2 '
"The legislative history of the blocking statute discloses that the law was
clearly designed as an effort to preclude pretrial discovery of French na-
tionals involved as parties in American litigation."'2 The English legisla-
tion "followed the enactment of the French act by only months. 213 This
statute allows for the "blocking" of all foreign pretrial discovery.24
Report of the United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law, 8 I.L.M. 785, 806 (1969).
21 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 45-47 (citing Batista, Confronting Foreign "Blocking"
Legislation: A Guide to Securing Disclosure from Non-resident Parties to American Litigation, 17
INT'L LAW. 61 (1980) (footnote omitted)).
On July 16, 1980, the French blocking statute ... was enacted. The statute contains
four sections. The first declares it unlawful ... for a French national to disclose to a
foreign entity any information which might impair France's sovereignty, security, or its
"basic economic interests." Article l(a) declares it unlawful for anyone ... to seek disclo-
sure... other than through means prescribed by French law. Article 2 requires any person
within the scope of [a]rticle I and l(a) to notify the "competent" French minister of any
request for information .... Finally, [a]rticle 3 purports to impose criminal sanctions
which would apply to a violation of the legislation.
Id. Article 3 provides that "[wlithout prejudice to more serious penalties provided by law, any
violations of article I and l(a) of this law shall be punishable by two to six months' imprisonment
and a fine of from 10,000 to 120,000 francs ($2,500 to $30,000) or either one of these two penalties
alone." Id. at 46-47 n.74. See also C. PEN art. IA, no. 80-538 (Fr.) ("Subject to treaties or interna-
tional agreements... it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose, in writing, orally or
otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents or information lead-
ing to the constitution of evidence with a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or in
connection therewith.").
With respect to the legislative history of the blocking statute, "Report No. 1814 of the French
National Assembly dated June 19, 1980... explains... [that] the blocking statute ... is premised
on the French perception of the 'abuse' inherent in all pretrial discovery in American courts. The
report is candid in its articulation of the purpose of the blocking statute to immunize French corpo-
rations from the need to comply with discovery obligations in American courts." SENATE REPORT,
supra note 8, at 47 (citing Batista, supra note 21). Cf. Toms, The French Response to Extraterritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 15 INT'L LAW. 585 (1981).
[T]he legislative history of [the French statute] shows only that [it] was adopted to protect
French interests from abusive foreign discovery procedures and excessive assertions of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction. Nowhere is there an indication that [it] was to impede litigation
preparations by French companies, either for their own defense or to institute lawsuits
abroad to protect their interests, and arguably such applications were unintended.
Id. at 598.
22 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 45-47 (citing Batista, supra note 21 at 64-5).
23 Toms, supra note 21, at 598.
24 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 46-47 (citing Batista, supra note 21, at 69-70). This
statute
grants the British Secretary of State the ability to prohibit persons or corporations in the
United Kingdom from furnishing commercial information or producing commercial docu-
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The French and English statutes illustrate the type of legislation
which many jurisdictions have enacted "[i]n order both to thwart the
extraterritorial assertion of U.S. substantive law and to foil the discov-
ery"2 attendant thereupon. It is this specific focus which distinguishes
"blocking laws" from "secrecy laws."
2. Secrecy Laws
The Swiss bank secrecy laws are the archetype of this variety of non-
disclosure provision. Enacted during the 1930s "in response to actions
by the German Nazi government [which was] seeking to acquire the as-
sets of fleeing or holocaust-annihilated Jews," these laws antedate the
relatively recent expansion in American civil and criminal discovery.26
Swiss banking secrecy is defined in the Swiss civil code as part of each
individual's right to privacy, and in each contract between the bank
and the bank customer. Enacted in 1934, SBA article 47 prohibits the
disclosure of customer transactions, and of bank communications with
its customers and others regarding those transactions. Sanctions are
applicable to those individuals who infringe upon these secrecy rights
directly, or induce or try to induce others to break the confidence, and
to those who violate the act through negligence. Switzerland is an ex-
ample of a country in which a violation of banking secrecy is a crimi-
nal as well as civil offense.27
ments for use in a foreign country .... The power to preclude compliance with U.S.
discovery orders or requests is so expansive that the Secretary of State can overrule compli-
ance with any pretrial device solely on the grounds that it is a 'pretrial disclosure' device.
Id.
25 Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6, at 847. See Prov. Can. Stat. 1976-2368 (the Cana-
dian non-disclosure law "authorizes jail terms of up to five years and fines of up to $5,000" for a
violation of its provisions.).
The enactment of blocking legislation was prompted by "the explosive application of American
substantive law abroad with a concomitant expansion in the use of American procedural rules,"
which followed closely upon the Supreme Court's decision in Societe Internationale Pour Participa-
tions Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). See supra pt. H (B).
26 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 33. See also Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and Its Legal
Implications in the United States, 14 NEw ENG. L. Rv. 18 (1978).
27 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 47-48 (footnotes omitted). See also Meyer, supra note 26;
Note, The Effect of the U.S.-SwissAgreement on Swiss Banking Secrecy and Insider Trading, 15 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 565 (1983).
Switzerland's bank secrecy laws are founded primarily in private law. In Switzerland,
public law preempts private law. Thus, secrecy cannot be asserted where public law re-
quires disclosure of particular information. Under Swiss law, two circumstances may re-
lieve a bank of its obligation to preserve customer confidences: (1) customer's voluntary
consent to disclose; and (2) a directive by competent Swiss authorities (such as court order)
to disclose Swiss private law give the bank customers, and not the bank, control of the
banking secret. Thus, the bank customer, subject to certain exceptions, may voluntarily
waive his banking secrecy protections and direct the bank to disclose any information re-
garding his account to the government or any other third parties.
1988]
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Recently, the once-impregnable Swiss bank secrecy has been attenu-
ated by several international conventions, including the 1977 U.S.-Swiss
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters; the Memorandum of
Understanding that was executed by the same two countries; and the
Law on International Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters
which these two nations executed in 1983.28 Unfortunately for American
law enforcement personnel, attenuation of Swiss banking secrecy has ap-
parently resulted in an increase in banking secrecy elsewhere.29
Probably the most notorious of these nouveau "secrecy jurisdic-
SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 48 (footnotes omitted).
28 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8. See also Note, The Effect of the US-Swiss Agreement on
Swiss Bank Secrecy on Insider Trading, supra note 27; de Capitani, International Legal Assistance in
Criminal Matters, 88 CREDrr SuIssE BULL. 18 (1982).
The Memorandum of Understanding "essentially confirms and supplements the U.S.-Swiss
Treaty of 1977" and through its Convention, "effectively guarantee[s] Swiss cooperation in SEC
investigations despite the absence of criminal sanctions in Switzerland." SENATE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 48. In 1984, "Convention XVI... was terminated by the enactment of a Swiss penal code
concerning the 'misuse of material non-public information,"' the result being "[Ec]ustomers placing
orders on the U.S. stockmarket are now automatically required to waive their secrecy rights, and
insider trading is considered to be a criminal offense under Swiss law." Id. at 49.
The 1977 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters required that
two criteria.., be met before the Swiss would justify the compulsory production of re-
quested information: (1) dual criminality; and (2) either the alleged offense had to be in-
cluded in the schedule attached to the treaty or the allegations in the request had to be of
such importance as to justify compulsory measures.
Id.
"The MAA does not insist upon the fulfillment of these criteria to achieve disclosure," but
it does require that mutual assistance proceedings comport with the "pertinent court pro-
cedures of the Swiss canton in which they take place." Id. Since "[iun two cantons in
particular, persons subject to bank secrecy laws, such as bankers, may refuse to testify as
witnesses or to hand over bank documents to the State authorities," this means that discov-
ery may become problematic even under the provisions of the MAA.
Id.
29 The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is the perfect example of this phenomenon:
As U.S. regulators probe deeper and deeper behind the veil of secrecy surrounding Swiss
banking, money has begun pouring out of Switzerland into the banks of the nearby Grand
Duchy. Though the torrent has hitherto gone largely unnoticed, foreigners' deposits in
Luxembourg banks jumped nearly 40% last year, to an estimated $160 billion.
That puts the Grand Duchy neck and neck with Switzerland and within reach of what
statistics suggest is the largest money haven in the world, the Cayman Islands, with
roughly $200 billion in deposits....
The Grand Duchy is going to great lengths to facilitate the banking influx....
Thus, in 1981 and again in 1984, Luxembourg's Parliament actually strengthened
bank secrecy laws, mandating jail sentences for anyone making unauthorized disclosures
about secret bank accounts. Explains Foreign Affairs and Economy Minister Jacques
Poos, "We discovered that our tight secrecy could be sold all over Europe and all over the
world."
Finn & Pouschine, Luxembourg: Color it Green, FORBES, Apr. 20, 1987, at 22. See generally SEN-
ATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 92-95 (describing the growth of Luxembourg's banking industry).
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tions" is the Cayman Islands:3  The Caymans became a colony of the
United Kingdom in 1959, and bank secrecy was initiated seven years
later.31 The new law imposed criminal sanctions for the "disclosure of
bank information or a lack of confidentiality concerning banking
matters. 32
In 1976, the Caymans "tightened their secrecy laws by passing the
Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Act, thereby transforming the
bank secrecy law into a sweeping business secrecy law."' 33 This Act "was
designed to ... render the 'misuse of confidential information ... a
criminal offense if committed in the islands and even if committed
outside the islands in relation to Caymanian subject matter.' 34
Because the new Act suffered from at least two "major flaws,"' 35 it
was amended in 1979 in order "to further clarify and strengthen [its pro-
30 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 50.
A vivid example of the rapid growth of tax haven banks and trust companies is offered by
the Cayman Islands. In 1964, the Caymans had only one or two banks and virtually no
offshore (non-resident) business.... [I]n late 1981, the island had about 30 multinational
full service "Type A" commercial banks and more than 300 "Type B" brass plate banks,
which are allowed to conduct only offshore business. By 1983 Cayman was said to have
425 banks. Moreover, the number of offshore companies has jumped from about 15,000 in
1981 to 36,000 in 1985. Yet, the population of the Cayman Islands is only 17,000.
Id. at 30-31.
31 Id. at 77.
32(l) Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise of his func-
tions under this law or when lawfully required to do so by any court of competent jurisdic-
tion within the islands or under the provisions of any law of the islands, no person shall
disclose any information relating to any application of any person under the provisions of
this law or to the affairs of a licensee which he has acquired in the performance of his
duties or the exercise of his functions under this law.
(2) Whoever contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offense and liable on summary
conviction to a fine not exceeding $2,000 or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 1 year
or both.
Id. (quoting the Banking and Trust Law 1966 § 10). The enactment of this measure brought the
Caymans into the British common law tradition by which "a banker [is obligated] to treat his cus-
tomers' financial affairs as confidential." Id. at 33. See also Tournier v. Nat'l Provincial and Union
Bank of Eng., 1 K.B. 461, 486 (1924) (banker may disclose banking information concerning a cus-
tomer where the banker is compelled by law to make such a disclosure).
33 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 50. The 1976 act was "a direct result of the Miami
Federal District Court's holding in United States v. Field which was unfavorable to the Caymans."
Id. at 77. In the Field case, "A grand jury subpoenaed a Cayman banker while he was in the U.S.
and... held him in contempt when he claimed both the Fifth Amendment and Cayman Bank
Secrecy law, and refused to testify." Id. at 50; see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404,
404 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 940, 940 (1976).
34 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 51 (PSI Staff Stud. 17).
35 Id. at 79.
[The Act's] broad wording could have led Caymanian courts to void parts of it as being too
vague. Furthermore, the law was deemed to have "no application" to "any professional
person acting in the normal course of business."
The latter proposition was considered a source of great difficulty, as "the extremely broad defi-
nition of 'professional persons' and 'normal course of business' might possibly have been construed
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visions] by specifically prohibiting the disclosure of all confidential infor-
mation with respect to business of a professional nature which arises in
or is brought into the islands. '36
The amended Act "is extraterritorial ... and thus applies to any
U.S. law enforcement agents who attempt to obtain confidential informa-
tion."' 37 Banks or bank employees who are approached for the disclosure
of such information must "notify their Attorney General and 'apply for
directions' from the Grand Court" of the Cayman Islands.38 Unless the
Court grants such an application,39 disclosure is a criminal offense pun-
ishable "on summary conviction [by] a fine not exceeding $5,000 or...
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years or both."'
The Act provides that these penalties can be doubled (a) whenever
an individual improperly discloses, or improperly attempts to disclose,
confidential information and then "receives or solicits on behalf of him-
self or another any reward for so doing," and/or (b) whenever "a profes-
sional person, entrusted as such with confidential information" either
improperly discloses, or improperly attempts to disclose, such informa-
tion.41 It also provides that "a Bank which gives a credit reference in
respect of a customer without first receiving the authorization of that
customer is guilty of [a criminal offense]."'42
The secrecy configuration that is achieved by the provisions of the
Caymans' Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Act is functionally
indistinguishable from the configuration that prevails under the laws of
to exonerate a banker, lawyer, or accountant who impart[ed] information solely to government offi-
cials under compulsion." Id. at 79 (quoting M. LANGER, PRACTICAL TAX PLANNING (1979)).
36 Id. at 51. Section 3.(l) of the Act provides that "[tihis law has application to all confidential
information with respect to business of a professional nature which arises in or is brought into the
islands and to all persons coming into possession of such information at any time thereafter whether
they be within the jurisdiction or therout [sic]." (emphasis added). Confidential Relationships (Preser-
vation) Act, § 3.(1) (Cayman Islands 1979) [hereinafter Confidential Act], reprinted in SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 8, at 79.
37 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 30, 51.
38 Id at 79. Confidential information is defined as "information concerning any property which
the recipient thereof is not, otherwise than in the normal course of business, authorized by the prin-
cipal to divulge." Confidential Act, § 3A, reprinted in SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 79. The
"Act extended the coverage of those prohibited from divulging information to bank employees, solic-
itors, government officials, and 'every kind of commercial agent' and 'every person subordinate to or
in the employ or control of such person for the purpose of his professional activities.'" Id. at 79.
39 The court can direct "(a) that the evidence be given; or (b) that the evidence shall not be
given; or (c) that the evidence shall be given subject to conditions which [it] may specify whereby the
confidentiality of the information is safeguarded." Confidential Act, § 3A.(3)(a)-(c), reprinted in
SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 79.
40 Id. § 4.(1)(b). An attempt at disclosure can also result in the imposition of the sanctions
described above. Id. § 4.(1)(a)(ii).
41 Id. § 4.(2) & (4).
42 Id. § 4.(5).
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such "haven" jurisdictions as the Bahamas,4 3 Panama,4 Luxembourg, 45
Barbados,' Antigua,' and Singapore.48  Each "shares the conviction
43 "Preservation of secrecy is widely held by the government, attorneys, and bankers to be
absolutely critical to the continued success and growth of the Bahamas as a major international
financial center." SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 67. Bahamian statutes establish a blanket-type
secrecy law which prohibits the disclosure of bank customer information without customer consent
or judicial or executive approval. One of the drafters of the current law stated that the intent was to
allow disclosure only after a court proceeding. However, there are no tax treaties, mutual assistance
treaties, [or] other cooperation agreements with the U.S., and Bahamian courts may easily find no
basis for ordering compliance. Id. at 52. See Banks and Trust Companies Regulation (Amendment)
Act, No. 3, § 10(1) (Bah. 1980); Banks Amendment Act, No. 65, § 19(1) (Bah. 1965). Individuals
who make disclosures that fall within the prohibitions of this Act commit a criminal offense and are
"liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifteen thousand dollars or to a term of impris-
onment not exceeding two years or to both such fine and imprisonment." Banks and Trust Compa-
nies Regulation (Amendment) Act, No. 3 § 10(3) (Bah. 1980). See Barclay's Bank Int'l, Ltd. v.
McKinney, No. 474 (Bah. S. Ct. Feb. 16, 1979); infra pt. II (C).
44 Under Panamanian Law, [flines can be imposed for disclosing information obtained from
commercial documents to foreign authorities, the investigation of the private affairs of a client of a
bank is forbidden, and the disclosure of information regarding the identity of a principal of a num-
bered bank account is against the law except in cases of criminal proceedings. SENATE REPORT,
supra note 8, at 102 (footnotes omitted) (citing the Commercial Code of Pan., arts. 88-89; Cabinet
Decree No. 238 (Pan. July 2, 1970); Law No. 18 (Pan. Jan. 28, 1959)). See generally id. at 101-08
(describing the growth of Panama's offshore banking industry).
45 Finn & Pouschine, supra note 29, at 22. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 92-
95 (describing the growth of Luxembourg's bank secrecy laws).
Physicians, surgeons .... and all other persons to whom, by reason of their position or
profession, secrets have been confided, and who reveal such secrets in cases other than
those in which they are called to testify in court and in those in which the law compels
their disclosure, shall be punishable by imprisonment from eight days to six months and a
fine from 100 to 500 francs.
Lux. Penal Code, art. 488, reprinted in SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 94. See also Law on Credit
Institutions, art. 16 (Lux.) (providing an exception to art. 488 of the Penal Code that bankers may
reveal account information to certain parties, i.e. persons listed on the account), reprinted in SENATE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 95.
46 See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 70-74 (describing the growth of Barbados
bank secrecy laws). Banking in Barbados is governed by the provisions of the Offshore Banking Act
(1979-26).
The provisions of the Offshore Banking Act which impose secrecy are sections 47 and 55. Sec-
tion 47 states that "information concerning the identity of a depositor, settler or beneficiary of a
trust, or concerning the assets, liabilities, transactions or other information in respect of a depositor,
settler or beneficiary of a trust" acquired by "a director, officer, employee or auditor of the licenses"
or "an employee of the Central Bank shall not [be disclosed] to any person except [under the limited
circumstances provided] under subsection (2)."
Id. at 72 (quoting the Offshore Banking Act). Section 55 provides that "[a]n examiner may not
have access to ... the name of any settler or beneficiary of a trust, if the deposit agreement or
instrument creating the trust... has directed that it be kept secret and the depositor, settler or
beneficiary is not a resident of Barbados." Id.
47 On December 31, 1982, Antigua enacted the International Business Corporations Act (Law
No. 28 of 1982) which.., provides for the establishment of international banks and captive insur-
ance companies....
Secrecy provisions of the act are very stringent and similar to those of the Caymans and Baha-
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... that, without secrecy, [its] financial section will collapse."4 9 Each of
the havens, therefore, jealously guards the identities and secrets of its
depositors.
B. Comity, Balancing and Good Faith: Extraterritorial Discovery in
Federal Criminal Investigations
It is a mistake to condemn bank secrecy per se because it is being
abused in some countries and jurisdictions. Persons and companies
transacting business with banks are entitled to a reasonable degree of
privacy in connection with their business transactions. The United
States itself, through the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, rec-
ognizes this right. The critical question is not whether a country has
mas. There are criminal penalties of up to U.S.$18,850 and a prison term not exceeding I year for
inquiries or disclosures concerning the business affairs of a bank or a transaction with a bank.
Id. at 56-57. See generally id. at 55-58 (describing bank secrecy in Antigua). Section 244 of the
Antiguan statute provides, in pertinent part, that:
(1) . . . no person shall disclose any information relating to the business affairs of
[a] customer that he has acquired as an officer, employee, agent, auditor, solicitor of the
banking corporation, or otherwise in the performance of his duties... except in the per-
formance of his duties ... pursuant to an order of a court... in Antigua and Barbuda ....
(4) Nothing in this act impairs the [bank's duty] to protect the confidentiality of the
business affairs of its customers.
Antiguan Int'l Bus. Corp. Act, No. 28, § 244 (1982), reprinted in SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at
57. The statement contained in § 244(4) of the act is a reiteration of the traditional British common
law position regarding the obligations of a banker to his depositors. See, eg., supra note 32.
48 See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 113-18 (describing bank secrecy in Singa-
pore). Bank secrecy in Singapore was established by the Banking Act of 1970, § 42-(2) which pro-
vided as follows:
(2) No official of any bank and no person who by reason of his capacity or office has
any means access to the records of the bank registers or any correspondence of material
with regard to the account of any individual customer of that bank shall give, divulge or
reveal any information whatsoever regarding the moneys or other relevant particulars of
the account of such customer to-
(a) any person who, or any bank, corporation or body of persons which, is not resi-
dent of Singapore; or
(b) any foreign government or organization, unless-
(i) the customer or his personal representatives gives or give his or their permission
so to do;
(ii) the customer is declared bankrupt; or
(iii) the information is required to assess the credit worthiness of the customer in
connection with or relating to bona fide commercial transaction or a prospective commer-
cial transaction.
Banking Act of 1970, § 42-(2) (Singapore), reprinted in SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 115. The
Act was amended as of Apr. 22, 1983: "The amended version grants even more privacy than the
previous one." Id. at 116. For a discussion of other "haven" jurisdictions, see generally id. at 53-5
(Anguilla); 74-6 (Bermuda); 84-9 (H.K.); 89-92 (Liechtenstein); 95-98 (Montserrat); 98-101 (Nether-
lands Antilles); 108-13 (St. Vincent and the Grenadines); 118-25 (S. Pacific); 128-34 (Turks and
Caicos Islands).
49 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 67.
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bank secrecy laws, but whether a country has built into its laws effective
and efficient means of piercing bank secrecy where there is reasonable
suspicion that a bank has been used in connection with a crime or as the
depository of the proceeds of a crime.5"
As part II(A) of this Article illustrates, "haven" jurisdictions believe
that their livelihood depends upon their ability to maintain the confi-
dences of those who patronize their banking institutions; because of that
belief, they have made every effort to eliminate any "effective and effi-
cient means of piercing [their] bank secrecy." Because these efforts have
been remarkably successful, federal law enforcement personnel often find
that it is impossible to pursue an investigation by traditional means, such
as serving a subpoena upon the individual or entity who is in possession
of the documents.51
5o Olsen, supra note 8, at 1008-09 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added); Right to Financial
Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1982).
[Miany states have adopted secrecy and blocking statutes specifically to protect viola-
tions of their sovereignty by overly aggressive United States investigators.... Although
[there is a tendency] to identify such reactive statutes as "second class law," or, worse,...
imply[ing] bad faith on the part of the foreign country, foreign governments do not share
this opinion. Many of these laws contain specific language noting that the legislation is
necessary to protect security or essential economic interests, to protect the freedom of com-
mercial shipping activity, to protect trading interests, or to prevent activity that adversely
affects foreign trade.
2 TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICTS AND ACCOMMODA-
TIONS 1329, 1331-32, 1355, 1363-64 (1984), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 3, 261-62 (footnotes omitted). One treatise notes:
[i]n the short term, the [U.S.] [G]overnment must... determine when its insistence on
obtaining foreign evidence at all costs is worth the potential diplomatic problems that may
ensue. Third-party witnesses caught in a conflict between the laws of two countries are
certain to become increasingly annoyed at their untenable position and may lobby foreign
governments for even stronger blocking and bank secrecy laws that already exist.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 265.
51 See, eg., Olsen, supra note 8, at 1008-11.
[Tihe two most common situations in which United States subpoenas seek evidence
located in other countries [are]: (1) when neutral intermediaries, such as banks or attor-
neys, possess the evidence of clients that is sought by the subpoena and (2) when the entity
that holds the evidence is located outside the United States but has a business relationship
with an entity in the United States, such as a parent or a subsidiary.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 302-03. See supra pts. II, II.
From the point of view of [U.S.] law enforcement officials, subpoenas are a legitimate and
direct means of obtaining information. However, many foreign governments consider
[U.S.] subpoenas issued to persons outside the United States as intrusive and an infringe-
ment on their sovereignty. These governments argue that there are less intrusive means of
obtaining information. For example, letters rogatory are a diplomatic means of obtaining
evidence between countries and there are sometimes treaty provisions that deal with the
same purpose. [U.S.] law enforcement officials contend, however, that these alternative
means of obtaining information are time consuming and often fail to produce results.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 301-02. The subpoenas that are at issue in extra-
territorial discovery are either grand jury subpoenas or subpoenas issued by an administrative agency
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"Despite the existence of [these] non-disclosure laws, U.S. courts are
still technically permitted to compel the production of documents under
the conflict of laws principal [sic] lex fori-the law of the forum governs
procedural matters. '5 2 But the availability of "laws which penalize pro-
ducers if they disclose ... documents for use in foreign litigation"53 can
such as the Securities Exchange Commission. See id. at 303-05. For a discussion of the issues that
can arise in this context, see Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of US. Courts Regarding the Use of
Subpoenas Duces Tecum to Obtain Discovery in Transnational Litigation: The Search for a Limiting
Principle, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1135 (1984); Note, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis
Based on Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1320 (1983); Note, Compelling Production of Documents
in Violation of Foreign Law: An Examination and Reevaluation of the American Position, 50 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 877 (1982).
52 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 44. "It is an established principle of conflict of laws that
the procedural law of the forum state applies to litigation in that state." RESTATEMENT OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW (REviSED), supra note 17, §§ 122, 127 and 127 comment a.
Failure to comply with an order to produce [documents, objects or other] information
may subject the person to whom the order is directed to sanctions, including [a] finding of
contempt, dismissal of a claim or defense, or default judgment, or may lead to a determina-
tion by the court that the facts to which the order was addressed are as asserted by the
opposing party.
Id. § 437(l)(b). In the litigation of criminal investigatory and liability issues, the primary sanction
for falling to comply with an order to produce is a contempt citation. See, e.g., United States v.
Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 815. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
53 Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6, at 844. Ironically, it was a decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court that provided the impetus for the development of such laws: In Societe Internatio-
nale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958),
a Swiss holding company was suing for the return of property seized by the Alien Property
Custodian during World War II. The district court dismissed plaintiff's complaint as a
sanction for its refusal to comply with the Court's order to produce bank records, despite a
finding that the Swiss government had constructively seized the documents and that plain-
tiff had shown good faith efforts to comply with the production order.
S.E.C. v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (footnote omitted). See
also Societe Internationale Industrielles, 357 U.S. at 201-02. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that "where plaintiff was prohibited by Swiss law from complying with the discovery order and there
was no showing of bad faith, the sanction of dismissal... was not justified." Banca Della Svizzera
Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 114. See also Societe Internationale Industrielles, 357 U.S. at 208-12. In the
course of rendering its holding, the Court noted that "fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a
weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws preventing
compliance are those of a foreign sovereign." Id. at 211. It was this observation that "encouraged
the proliferation of foreign nonproduction legislation by permitting the inference that American
courts will not compel discovery if production will subject a party to criminal sanctions abroad."
Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6, at 846. See also Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at
111 (disclosure ordered where Swiss corporation acted in bad faith by making deliberate use of Swiss
non-disclosure law); Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962) (subpoena
duces tecum modified on a showing that compliance would violate Panamanian law); Ings v. Fergn-
son, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960) (subpoena modified to avoid production of documents protected
under Canadian law); First Nat'l Bank of New York v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960) (production would not be ordered to the extent that it would violate
Panamanian law).
Recently, in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2542
(1987), the Supreme Court returned to this issue. The Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale
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result in the de facto emasculation of this principle. 54
The viability of the principle is a function of the standards that regu-
late production even though it contravenes the law of the nation which is
the situs of the information that is to be produced. This part describes
the standards that are utilized in this regard, while part II(C) of this
Article examines the decisional law that has arisen with respect to their
implementation.
"In the past, the courts have used three standards to evaluate non-
production: comity, balancing, and good faith."55
'Comity'... is the recognition which one nation allows within its terri-
tory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, hav-
ing due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protec-
tion of its laws.56
decision involved an issue which is not directly pertinent to the matters under consideration in this
Article, i.e., whether the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444 "'provides the exclusive and
mandatory procedures for obtaining documents and information located within the territory of a
foreign signatory.'" Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2548 (quoting In re
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 124 (8th Cir. 1986)). The Court rejected
the argument that the Convention supersedes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure so as to become
"the exclusive means for obtaining evidence located abroad," and held that "the Hague Convention
[does] not deprive ... District Courts] of the jurisdiction [they] otherwise possess[ ] to order a
foreign national party... to produce evidence physically located within a signatory nation." Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2553 (footnote omitted). The Court also held,
however, that "American courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, [a] should exercise special vigi-
lance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery
may place them in a disadvantageous position.... [and] [b] should... take care to demonstrate due
respect for any special problem confronted by the foreign litigant.., and for any sovereign interest
expressed by a foreign state." Id. at 2557. The Court did "not articulate specific rules to guide this
delicate task of adjudication." Id.
54 "U.S. courts have had difficulty acquiring information, because some jurisdictions consider
American production orders to be an infringement on their sovereignty. A few countries have even
filed diplomatic protests with the U.S. State Department over U.S. discovery requests." SENATE
REPORT, supra note 8, at 44-45.
55 Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6, at 853. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 44-46.
See Comment, Fear of Foreign Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment, 58 IowA L. REv. 1304 (1973)
(for further information).
56 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). See also Societe Nationale Industrielle Aeros-
patiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555 n.27; Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 368, 370 n.1 (1797); J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS section 38 (M. Bigelow 8th ed. 1883). In Societe
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale the Court was required to consider the effects of the French
"blocking statute" upon a discovery request which was served pursuant to litigation that was pend-
ing in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. See Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546. The Court offered the following comments on this issue:
It is well-settled that such ["blocking"] statutes do not deprive an American court of
the power to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence even though the
act of production may violate that statute.... It is clear that American courts are not
required to adhere blindly to the directives of such a statute.... The lesson of comity is
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After the U.S. Supreme Court issued its holding in Societe Internati-
onale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers,57
"three Second Circuit cases articulated the 'pure comity' approach to
[transnational discovery].""8 This approach was discarded after it be-
came apparent that it represented little more than passive acquiescence in
the refusal to comply with discovery requests.59
The new approach was a "balancing" test which was predicated
upon certain provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States.' Section 39(1) of the Restatement pro-
vides that "[a] state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule of
law is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely because such
exercise requires a person to engage in conduct subjecting him to liability
under the law of another state having jurisdiction with respect to that
conduct."61
that neither the discovery order nor the blocking statute can have the same omnipresent
effect that it would have in a world of only one sovereign. The blocking statute thus is
relevant... only to the extent that its terms and its enforcement identify the nature of the
sovereign interests in nondisclosure of specific kinds of material.
Id. at 2556 n.29 (citation omitted).
57 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
58 Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6, at 854 (footnote omitted) (the three cases were Appli-
cation of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962) (subpoena duces tecum modified on a
showing that compliance would violate Panamanian law); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir.
1960) (subpoena modified to avoid production of documents protected under Canadian law); and
First Nat'l Bank of New York v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960)
(production would not be ordered to the extent that it would violate Panamanian law).
59 In [these] cases, the courts merely deferred to foreign nondisclosure laws by refusing
even to issue discovery orders. Such deference does not adequately address the need to
foster American substantive law, the potential for expansion of nondisclosure jurisdictions,
or the injustice of depriving the requesting party of discovery.
The courts rejected the Second Circuit approach when it became clear that such defer-
ence would not address those other important interests. The analysis of the comity stan-
dard is still relevant, however, since the importance of friendly relations abroad remains a
central factor in most decisions in this area.
Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6 at 854-55 (footnotes omitted). See also United States v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 116
F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 114 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
60 See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 897; Minpeco, S.A., 116 F.R.D. at 517; Banca
Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 114.
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 39(1) (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW]. See Minpeco,
S.A., 116 F.R.D. at 517. The reference to "jurisdiction" encompasses both subject matter and per-
sonal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 8, at 1019-22; Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92
F.R.D. at 114 (subject matter jurisdiction under sections 21(3) and 27 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(e) and 78a(a). See also In re Sealed Case, No. 87-5256, slip op. (cited
in 56 U.S.L.W. 2283 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 6, 1987)) ("if the government shows that there is a reasonable
probability that ultimately it will succeed in establishing the facts necessary for the exercise of [per-
sonal] jurisdiction [in a particular matter], compliance with a grand jury [ ] subpoena may be di-
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Section 40 of the Restatement lists the factors that are to be used in
determining whether such an exercise is appropriate:
Where two States have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules
of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct
upon the part of a person, each State is required by international law to
consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement ju-
risdiction in the light of such factors as: (a) vital national interests of
each of the States; (b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that
inconsistent enforcement actions would impose iupon the person;
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other State; (d) the nationality of the person; and
(e) the extent which enforcement by action of either State could rea-
sonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by
that State. 6
2
Two of the most common rationales for refusing to comply with U.S.
discovery requests are predicated on the provisions of section 40:
"(1) disclosure by the foreign party will violate the law of its own country
and may be accompanied by criminal sanctions, and (2) foreign govern-
ments have a strong commercial interest in protecting their domestic cor-
porations from the expense and hazards of defending American
litigation."63
rected") (quoting Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1215 (1983)).
For the proposition that "the [flifth [a]mendment privilege applies only where the sovereign
compelling the testimony and the sovereign using the testimony are both restrained from compelling
self-incrimination," see United States v. (under seal), 794 F.2d 920, 925-28 (4th Cir. 1986) (because
the fifth amendment "would not prohibit the use of compelled incriminating testimony in a Philip-
pine court, it afford[ed] an immunized witness no privilege not to testify before a federal grand jury
on the ground that this testimony [would] incriminate him under Philippine law"). See also Zicarelli
v. Investigation Commission, 406 U.S. 472 (1972); Note, The Reach of the Fifth Amendment Pivi-
lege When Domestically Compelled Testimony May Be Used in a Foreign Country's Court, 69 VA. L.
REv. 875 (1983).
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 61, § 40. See also IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 257-77.
63 Batista, supra note 21, at 80. Interestingly enough, in a separate opinion in Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale, Justice Blackmun offered the following observation as to the importance of
protecting American interests from the hazards of foreign discovery:
Our Government's interests.. .are far more complicated than can be represented by
the limited parties before a court. The United States is increasingly concernea, for exam-
pie, with protecting sensitive technology for both economic and military reasons. It may
not serve the country's long-term interest to establish precedents that could allow foreign
courts to compel production of the records of American corporations.
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 107 S. CL 2542, 2560 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
The first of the above-described defenses is grounded in a frequently-overlooked concept known
as the "act of state" doctrine. See, eg., Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6, at 850 n.38. "The
act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes the courts of this country from inquiring
into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own
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In adjudicating the merits of these contentions, American courts
presently rely upon a modified version 4 of the "balancing" test. This
approach emphasizes the vital national interests of the states involved
and the hardships of compliance and further adds considerations to the
Restatement test.65 Under the modified test "the principal factors to
consider ... are (1) the competing interests of the nations whose laws are
in conflict, (2) the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from
whom discovery is sought, (3) the importance to the litigation of the in-
formation and documents requests, and (4) the good faith of the party
requesting discovery." '66
territory." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); see also Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). Only two decisions have considered the application of the
"act of state" doctrine to the problem of transnational discovery. See infra pt. II(C).
64 See infra, notes 65-66 and accompanying text (for the elements of this modified text).
This modified version of the "balancing" test was developed as it became apparent
that various of the factors listed in § 40 are of minimal or no utility in the adjudication of
claims advanced by non-disclosing parties under the protection of foreign "blocking"
and/or "secrecy" laws.
See generally Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6, at 856-70; Minpeco, S.A. 116 F.R.D. at 522-23
(for a discussion of the development of this text).
65 Minipeco, S.A., 116 F.R.D. at 522-23.
Courts... have characterized the first two factors-the competing interests of the
countries involved and the hardship imposed by compliance-as far more important...
than the last three....
At least two other factors have been found to be significant in addition to those [listed
in section 40 of the Restatement]. The first is the importance of the information and docu-
ments requested to the conduct of the litigation....
The second... is the good or bad faith of the party resisting discovery .... Courts
have considered a resisting party's good faith efforts to comply with discovery... [and]
whether a party's inability to produce documents as a result of foreign law prohibitions was
fostered by its own conduct prior to the commencement of the litigation.
Id. See also SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Compagnie
Frangaise D'Assurance Pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098
(1981); Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. First
Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138
(N.D. Ill. 1979). See also Batista, supra note 21, at 82 ("[a]nother very compelling rebuttal...
applies.., where the non-disclosing defendant itself, bears responsibility for the enactment of the
concealment legislation).
Three basic types of bad faith can count against a nondisclosing party. The first is the
secreting of documents in a jurisdiction where they cannot be produced legally.... Sec-
ond, the collusion of a company with a foreign government by seeking the implementation
of blocking legislation indicates a deliberate intent to contravene American discovery prac-
tice. Third, the absence of any affirmative efforts to comply with a discovery order by
seeking waiver of foreign law objections also indicates bad faith.
Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6, at 871 (footnote omitted); see also Note, Extraterritorial
Discovery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith, supra note 51, at 1320 (1983).
66 Minipeco, S.A., 116 F.R.D. at 523. See also Olsen, supra note 8, at 1022-24; Note Strict
Enforcement, supra note 6, at 856-73. The modified balancing test also reflects the influence of the
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C. Decisions Applying the Restatement Balancing Test
The two most significant applications of the balancing test have af-
fected the Bank of Nova Scotia. In the first,67 the Bank appealed a civil
contempt citation" issued subsequent to the Bank's refusal to comply
with a pretrial subpoena duces tecum issued by a federal grand jury
which concerned information supposedly in the Bank's Bahamian
branch.59
The government moved to compel production.7 ° In response, the
Bank "presented an affidavit showing that compliance with the subpoena
could expose [it] to prosecution under the Bahamian bank secrecy
tentative draft of the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 17,
§ 437(1)(c), which provides that
[i]n issuing an order directing production of information located abroad, a court in the
United States should take into account the importance to the investigation or litigation of
the documents or other information requested; the degree of specificity of the request;
whether the information originated in the United States; the extent to which compliance
with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the information is
located; and the possibility of alternative means of securing the information.
"The Tentative Draft recommends [a] balancing approach for the decision of whether to order
production and then applies the good faith standard to the question of whether sanctions should be
used to enforce the order." Note, Strict Enforcement, supra note 6, at 865 (footnote omitted). For
an evaluation of the approach contained in § 437(1)(c), see id. at 866-70. See also United States v.
Toyota Motor Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1158, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (applying the approach contained in
§ 437(l)(c)).
In assessing good faith, it is important to consider the nature and purpose of the statute which
impedes compliance with a discovery request: "[S]tatutes that frustrate [the] goal [of adjudication
by United States courts] need not be given the same deference by courts of the United States as
substantive rules of law at variance with the law of the United States." See supra note 17; INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 261 (footnote omitted). "'[I]t seems that U.S. courts view
the interests of states that are "secrecy havens" with less respect than the interests of states where
underlying economic activity is centered,"' which suggests that "the good faith burden is heavier in
those states that adopt these practices." INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 261 n.
109 (quoting RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 17, § 437, re-
porter's note 8).
67 United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S.
1119 (1983) [hereinafter Nova Scotia I]. See also infra note 105 and accompanying text.
68 Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1385.
69 Id. at 1386.
The Bank... is a Canadian chartered bank with branches ... in forty-five countries,
including.., the Bahamas. A federal grand jury conducting a tax and narcotics investiga-
tion issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Bank calling for the production of certain
records maintained at the Bank's main branch or any of its branch offices in Nassau, Baha-
mas and Antigua, Lesser Antilles, relating to the bank accounts of a customer of the
Bank.... The Bank declined to produce the documents, asserting that compliance with
the subpoena without the customer's consent or an order of the Bahamian courts would
violate Bahamian bank secrecy laws.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See supra note 43 (for the provisions of the Bahamian secrecy law).
70 Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1386.
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law."71 The district court did not find this circumstance compelling and
granted the government's motion.72 "[T]he Bank's Miami agent [then]
appeared before the grand jury and formally declined to produce the doc-
uments called for by the subpoena."73 The district court held the Bank
in contempt for failing to obey its original order, after which the Bank
appealed to the Fifth Circuit.74
On appeal, the Bank argued that the district court improperly ana-
lyzed [the] case under the balancing test of section 40 of the Restatement
adopted in United States v. Field.75 In Field, a Cayman bank officer was
served with a subpoena issued by a grand jury investigating tax evasion.76
He refused to answer questions concerning his activities with the bank's
clientele, asserting that to do so would violate Cayman secrecy laws.77
The government did not disagree,78  but "[u]pon stipulation that [he]
would continue to refuse to answer the questions before the grand jury,
71 Id. at 1387.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1389 (citing United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940
(1976)).
Actually this was the third argument which the bank presented. The first two arguments were
(a) "that there were insufficient grounds to enforce the subpoena ... [and (b)] that enforcing the
subpoena would violate due process." Id. at 1385. The first argument was an attempt to persuade
the Eleventh Circuit to "require the government to show that the documents sought [were] relevant
to an investigation properly within the grand jury's jurisdiction and not sought primarily for another
purpose." Id. at 1387. The appellate court rejected this argument as "impos[ing] undue restrictions
upon the grand jury investigative process .. " Id.
The second argument was that "compliance... would require [the Bank] to violate the Baha-
mian bank secrecy law.., therefore... violat[ing] due process under Societe Internationale Power
Participations Industriells v. Rogers." Id. at 1388 (citation omitted). The Bank contended "that it
[was] a disinterested custodian of the documents" and that "it is fundamentally unfair to require a
'mere stakeholder' to incur criminal liability in the Bahamas." Id. The Eleventh Circuit rejected the
argument (a) because "[t]he district court found [that] the Bank had not made a good faith effort to
comply with the subpoena", and (b) because "the Bank [was] not being denied a constitutionally
required forum to recover confiscated assets," as had been the plaintiff in Societe Internationale. Id.
See also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
76 United States vs. Field, 532 F.2d 404, 405 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
77 Id. (footnotes omitted). "He submitted an affidavit by an expert on Cayman law that stated
that Field could be subject to criminal punishment for answering the questions before the grand
jury." Id. at 406. The affidavit also stated that "the bank examiner of the Cayman Islands could
require Field to" reveal whether he had testified before the grand jury. Id. "If Field refused to
answer the questions of the bank examiner, he was subject to a criminal penalty of up to six months
imprisonment." Id.
Field also predicated his refusal to answer on the proposition that "he would incriminate him-
self in violation of his [f]ifth [a]mendment rights." Id. at 405. He "was granted immunity and
ordered to resume his testimony," but "still refused to answer the questions." Id.
78 Id. at 406 (Field also pointed out that by "testifying before the grand jury [he] would subject
himself to criminal prosecution in the Cayman Islands, his place of employment and residence.").
Moreover, after entering this order, the district court made the following comments:
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the district court held him in civil contempt .... 11
On appeal the Fifth Circuit rejected his argument that "as a matter
of international comity [it] should refuse to enforce the subpoena.""0
Field contended that "nations should make every effort to avoid the situ-
ation.., where one nation requires an act that the other nation makes
illegal.""1 In rejecting this contention, the appellate court began "with
the proposition that the fact that the district court's order [would] sub-
ject Field to criminal prosecution in his country of residence does not of
itself prohibit enforcement of the subpoena. ' 82
The court then applied the balancing test prescribed by section 40 of
the Restatement, contrasting the need of the United States to thwart vio-
lation of its tax laws against blanket secrecy laws of the Cayman Is-
lands.8 3 Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit found that the Cayman
Islands' interest "must give way."84
The court observed that "[u]nder our system of jurisprudence the
grand jury's function in investigating possible criminal violations is vi-
tal." 5  After elaborating on this proposition, the court held that "[t]o
defer to the law of the Cayman Islands and refuse to require Field to
testify would significantly restrict the essential means that the grand jury
I think the record should show that this court finds that there is, in fact, a reasonable
probability that Mr. Field is going to be exposed to some criminal charges and some crimi-
nal punishment for violating the Cayman Bank Secrecy Act.
Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 407. Field also reiterated his fifth amendment argument, again without success: The
court held that the subpoena [was] not an attempt to elicit information from Field which [would]
later be used against him in a criminal case. The fifth amendment is simply not pertinent to the
situation where a foreign state makes the act of testifying a criminal offense. Id.
See generally S. Arkin, The Fifth Amendment and Fear of Foreign Prosecution, Bus. CRIME
COMMENTARY, Mar. 1987, at 2; Comment, Fear of Foreign Prosecution and the Fifth Amendment,
supra note 55; Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); United States v. Araneta, 794
F.2d 920 (4th Cir.), stay granted, 107 S. Ct. 331 (1986); United States v. Mikutaitis, 800 F.2d 159
(7th Cir.), stay granted, 107 S. Ct. 310 (1986) (for a further discussion of this argument).
81 Field, 532 F.2d at 407 (citing United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2nd
Cir. 1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 61, § 40. See supra pt.
11(B).
82 Field, 532 U.S. at 407. See generally American Industrial Contracting, Inc. v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 326 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Pa. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw, supra note 61, § 39 (cited by the court as support for this proposition).
83 The first and most important factor... is the relative interest of the states involved ....
Mhe United States seeks to obtain information concerning the violation of its tax laws ....
[T]he Cayman Islands seeks to protect the right of privacy that is incorporated into its
bank secrecy laws. Unfortunately, the Cayman Government position appears to be that
any testimony concerning the bank will violate its laws.
Field, 532 F.2d at 407. See supra pt. II(B).
84 See Field, 532 F.2d at 407.
85 Id.
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has of evaluating whether to bring an indictment." 6
The court offered two additional reasons why U.S. interests should
prevail: "[tihere could be no question that Field would be required to
respond to the grand jury's questions if this was solely a domestic
case."8 7 Since Field could be required to respond to the questions if he
were a citizen of the United States; the court found no barrier to impos-
ing a similar requirement, notwithstanding the fact that he was not a
citizen of the United States.88
The Fifth Circuit also "reject[ed] Field's contention ... that only an
economic regulation"" was involved, stressing the vital national interest
of revenue collection.9"
The Bank of Nova Scotia91 "attempt[ed] to distinguish Field ... on
four grounds."92 The Bank began by pointing out that it was "not under
86 Id. at 408.
87 Id. As support for this observation, the court cited the "wide discretion" which "this coun-
try allows... to investigative bodies in obtaining information concerning bank activities." Id. The
court also relied upon similar practices in the United Kingdom and in Switzerland, as well as in the
Cayman Islands:
[Alt oral argument, [Field's] attorney conceded that under Cayman law the director
of banking in the Cayman Islands would be able to obtain information from Field concern-
ing the bank's operations in investigations instituted by legal authority in the Cayman
Islands. In short, Field seeks to prohibit a [U.S.] grand jury from obtaining information
that would have been obtainable by officials there for their own investigations. Since the
general rule appears to be that for domestic investigations such information would be ob-
tainable, we find it difficult to understand how the bank's customers' rights of privacy
would be significantly infringed simply because the investigating body is a foreign tribunal.
Id.
88 See infra note 90.
89 Field, 532 F.2d at 408.
90 Id. at 409.
The collection of revenue is crucial to the financial integrity of the republic. In addi-
tion, the subject being investigated by this grand jury... has been demonstrated to be a
severe law enforcement problem.... If this court were to countenance Mr. Field's refusal
to testify it would significantly restrict the ability of the grand jury to obtain information
which might possibly uncover criminal activities of the most serious nature. In light of the
... significant interest this nation has in tax enforcement, without any specific direction
from Congress, we see no reason not to enforce the subpoena.
Id. at 408-09 (footnotes omitted). See generally H.R. REP. No. 91-975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4397 (supporting the court's proposition that
the subject of the grand jury investigation constituted "a severe law enforcement problem").
91 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
92 Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d at 1390.
The district court concluded that because compliance with the subpoena [might] cause
the Bank to violate Bahamian penal laws, it was appropriate to follow the balancing test
adopted in Field. Because we conclude this case is controlled by Field, we affirm the court
below.
Id. at 1389. Although there is some ambiguity in the language of the opinion, it appears that the
Bank conceded the applicability of the Restatement balancing test, but argued that the district court
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investigation by the grand jury, unlike the situation in Field."93 The
Eleventh Circuit found that this was not significant, "[a] careful reading
of Field reveals that the fact that Castle Bank and Trust Company was
under investigation did not affect the court's analysis." 94
The Bank also contended that its "case was distinguishable from
Field because documentary evidence [was] requested rather than testimo-
nial evidence as in Field.""5 The Eleventh Circuit found that this distinc-
tion "while real, [was] immaterial," 6 reasoning that "whether the
subpoena [would] be enforced [was] a matter of international comity."97
The Bank then argued that its case was "distinguishable from Field
because the... subpeona call[ed] for information located in the Bahamas
instead of the United States."98 The court rejected this argument be-
cause it found that (a) "the disclosure to the grand jury will occur in this
country... [and (b)] the affront to the Bahamas occurs no matter where
the information is originally located." 99
Finally, the Bank contended that the government" 'could avoid...
disrespect for the sovereignty of a friendly nation' by... applying for an
order... permitting disclosure from the Supreme Court of the Baha-
mas."1"0 The court rejected this argument on grounds that the proce-
dure was adverse to the sovereignty interests of the United States. 101 The
had erred in the analysis which it had utilized in applying the test to the facts that were before it.
See, e.g., id. at 1389-91.
93 Id. at 1390.
94 Id.
[The Field] court was concerned with the proliferation of foreign secret bank accounts
utilized by Americans to evade income taxes and conceal crimes.... The instant subpoena
calls for the production of certain records relating to bank accounts of a U.S. citizen pursu-
ant to a tax and narcotics investigation.
Id. (citation omitted).
95 Id.
96 Id. "Whether the requested information is testimonial or documentary, the effect on the
competing state interests will be the same. The deference accorded the Bahamian interest is not to
be diminished by the form of the requested information." Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. "[Tihe interest of the Bahamas in preserving the secrecy of these records is impinged by
the fact of disclosure itself." Id.
100 Id.
101 See id. at 1391.
The judicial assistance procedure does not afford due deference to the United States'
interests. In essence, the Bank asks the court to require our government to ask the courts
of the Bahamas to be allowed to do something lawful under U.S. law. We conclude such a
procedure to be contrary to the interests of our nation and outweigh the interests of the
Bahamas.
Id. The court also found it significant that
[a]pplying for judicial assistance... is not a substantially equivalent means for obtaining
production because of the cost in time and money and the uncertain likelihood of success
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situation was analytically indistinguishable from that which was at issue
in Field. 102
The Eleventh Circuit reached an identical result several years later
in the second Bank of Nova Scotia case.10 3 The Bank was served with a
grand jury subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of documents
"from the Bank's branches in the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands and An-
tigua." 1" It moved to quash, "asserting that if it complied... it would
violate the secrecy laws of the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands."' 10 5
The district court denied the motion and ordered the Bank to produce
the documents.10 6
The Bank made no effort to comply with the court's order other
than filing a petition before the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands. 7
This petition sought permission to disclose the documents sought by the
subpoena.108  "The Grand Court... denied the petition... [and] or-
dered the Bank not to produce the documents."" ° Thereafter, the Bank
filed another motion seeking relief from the subpoena.110 The district
in obtaining the order. According to the affidavit from a member of the Honorable Society
of Lincoln's Inn, England, and of the Bahamas Bar, the Supreme Court of the Bahamas
does not have power to order disclosure if the subject of the investigation is criminal only
under the tax laws of the United States. Therefore, it is not clear to any degree of certainty
that the Bahamian court would order disclosure of all the requested documents.
Id. at 1390-91 (footnote omitted). Also, "[tihe Bank conceded at oral argument that if the grand
jury [were] conducting a tax investigation the documents could not be obtained through the judicial
assistance procedure." Id. at 1391 n.8.
102 See id. at 1391. See also supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
In Field the vital role of a grand jury's investigative function to our system ofjurispru-
dence and the crucial importance of the collection of revenue to the "financial integrity of
the republic" outweighed the Cayman Islands' interest in protecting the right of privacy
incorporated into its bank secrecy laws.... The [U.S.] interest in the case before us has
not been diminished since Field was decided. The Bank asserts the Bahamas' interest in
the right of privacy; this interest is similarly outweighed. A Bahamian court would be able
to order production of these documents.... It is incongruous to suggest that a U.S. court
afford greater protection to the customer's right of privacy than would a Bahamian court
simply because this is a foreign tribunal.
Id. (citations omitted).
103 United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 722 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1983), on remand 740 F.2d
817 (1lth Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985) [hereinafter Nova Scotia II].
104 Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 820 (footnote omitted).
105 Id. (footnote omitted). See also supra pt. II(A).
106 Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 820.
107 Id.
108 Id. A denial of the petition was issued with leave granted to the Bank to later renew the
petition. The denial was not appealed. Id.
109 Id. at 821.
110 The Bank's only effort to locate any documents either in the Bahamas or in the Cay-
mans between the June first motion and scheduled October hearing was a search conducted
in Nassau on October 14, 1983, which produced no documents. The only document pro-
duced by the Bank during this seven month period was a xerox copy of a draft drawn...
by the branch in Nassau....
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court denied this motion and ordered the Bank to comply with the sub-
poena or face a contempt hearing.
111
The Bank again made no attempt to comply, and the hearing was
convened as scheduled.112 Because it found that the Bank had not made
a good faith effort to comply with the subpoena, the court held the Bank
in contempt and "imposed a fine of $25,000 per day continuing until the
Bank complied... or the grand jury expired.""' 3 The Attorney General
of the Bahamas issued an order allowing the Bank to produce the docu-
ments requested by the subpoena. 14 The Bank then delivered various
documents from its Bahamian branches.' When the Governor of the
Cayman Islands authorized the disclosure of the documents which were
located at the Bank's Cayman Islands branch," 6 the Bank immediately
produced the documents in question." 7
Thereafter, a bank inspector "arrived in Nassau... and immedi-
ately discovered additional documents in two of the Bank's Bahamian
branches.""' Later, this same inspector was preparing for an appear-
ance before the grand jury when he realized that documents "were still
missing.""' 9 These documents were eventually produced.' 20
During this chain of events, the Bank was in the process of appeal-
ing the finding of contempt and the fine imposed by the district court.'
2
'
Id. (footnote omitted).
I1I Id.
112 Id.
After this disclosure, the Assistant United States Attorney insisted that there were
Bahamian documents still missing. The Bank reiterated that all of its branches in Nassau
had been searched and there were no other documents in the Bahamas.
Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. This authorization followed a Cayman Grand Court decision reiterating its refusal to
allow the Bank to produce the documents. Id.
115 Id. The Assistant U.S. Attorney again insisted that a substantial number of documents had
not been produced. Id.
116 Id. at 822 (footnote omitted). His arrival was apparently prompted by a court order. See
id.
117 Id. at 822.
118 Id. at 822-23. The inspector was assigned to "appear before the grand jury-to authenti-
cate all of the documents that had been produced." Id. at 822.
119 Id. at 822-23.
120 Id. at 823 (They were delivered to the grand jury on Jan. 25, 1984.).
121 The appeal was initiated shortly after the order was entered; on December 28, 1983, the
Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion remanding the matter to the district court for further proceed-
ings. United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 722 F.2d 657 (11th Cir. 1983). The court remanded the
matter (a) because it found that "the enforcement of such subpoenas requires the balancing of many
factors including the national interests of the countries involved," and (b) because it was concerned
that although "the district court attempted to do this," the attempt was flawed due to the fact that
"much relevant information was either not available or deliberately withheld or both." Id. at 658.
The court stayed the imposition of the fine until Nov. 14, 1983. Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 821.
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In this appeal, the Bank argued that the district court erred in imposing a
contempt sanction because (a) the Bank had made a good faith attempt
to comply with the subpoena, and (b) compliance with the subpoena re-
quired it to violate Cayman Islands secrecy laws. 22
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the first argument, finding that the
Bank had "blithely ignored" all warnings and persisted in refusing "to
perform a diligent search" of the documents held by its various
branches. 123 It also rejected the second argument, finding that the dis-
trict court had correctly "balanc[ed] the several factors enunciated in
[s]ection 40 of the Restatement ... [and] properly concluded that en-
forcement of the subpoena was proper.
124
With regard to the second finding, the court held that enforcement
was proper because the subpoena was intended to "obtain information
concerning the money transactions of individuals who are the target of a
narcotics investigation.""12 Since such investigations are "a concern of
paramount importance to our nation," . . . the [e]nforcement ... [was]
consistent with the grand jury's goals of investigating criminal
122 Nova Scotia I1, 740 F.2d at 824, 826. The argument that enforcement was precluded by the
fact that production would require the bank to violate Cayman Islands law actually appeared in two
guises, the first of which involved the application of the Restatement balancing test. See supra notes
123-29 and accompanying text.
The second appearance involved invocation of the act of state doctrine. See supra note 63. The
Nova Scotia 11 court found that
[t]he doctrine is completely inapplicable to this case. The... doctrine is primarily
designed to avoid impingement by the judiciary upon the conduct of foreign policy by the
Executive Branch. It is aimed at preventing judicial interference with the conduct of for-
eign relations by questioning the validity of the acts of foreign sovereigns in the context of a
civil suit.
Nova Scotia 11, 740 F.2d at 831 (footnote omitted). The court then held that section 41 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law: "render[ed] [the doctrine] completely inapplicable
in the investigatory or criminal context." Id. The court also found that the doctrine did not apply
to the facts before it "because the Cayman Grand Court purported to control conduct in the United
States by blocking compliance with the grand jury subpoena"; the Nova Scotia II court concluded
that this action of the Cayman Court was itself a violation of the doctrine. See id. at 832. And,
finally, the court agreed with the district court that U.S. "law does not require blindly giving effect to
the act of a foreign sovereign without 'having due regard.., to the rights of its own citizens, or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.'" Id. (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113, 164 (1895)).
The Bank had also asserted that reversal of the contempt order was necessitated by the fact that
the district court's action ignored a diplomatic agreement between the United States and the Cay-
man Islands. See id. at 824, 829-30. And two amici, the United Kingdom and the Cayman Islands,
contended that the "subject subpoena [was] void because it was issued contrary to the provisions of
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961." Id. at 830-31.
123 Id. at 826.
124 Id. at 827. In the opinion, the treatment of the issues of "good faith" and the application of
the balancing test are juxtaposed in a manner that makes it clear that the court is applying the
modified balancing test described in pt. II(B). See supra pt. II(B).
125 Nova Scotia 11, 740 F.2d at 827.
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matters." 
1 2 6
The court also found that enforcement was not an intolerable in-
fringement upon Cayman Islands bank secrecy: Even if "an absolute
right to privacy" existed under Cayman Islands law, its application to
American depositors was "substantially reduced when balanced against
the interests of their own government engaged in a criminal investigation
since they are required to report [their] transactions to the United
States."' 27 Also, the court noted that the Cayman Islands interest "in
protecting the privacy of [its] bank customers is also diminished... since
the investigating body is a federal grand jury which is required by law to
maintain the secrecy of its proceedings."'' 28
As an almost-afterthought, the court parsed the remaining require-
ments of the Restatement balancing test:
[D]isclosure ... would take place in the United States. The foreign
origin of the subpoenaed documents should not be a decisive factor.
The nationality of the Bank is Canadian, but its presence is pervasive
in the United States. The Bank has voluntarily elected to do business
in numerous foreign host countries and has accepted the incidental risk
of occasional inconsistent governmental actions.
129
With respect to the latter proposition, the court quoted a passage from
Field in which that court found that it could "not acquiesce in the propo-
sition that [U.S.] criminal investigations must be thwarted whenever
there is conflict with the interest of other states."' 30
The Bank of Nova Scotia and Field decisions illustrate that under
the balancing test as recently applied, "almost nothing can overcome the
126 Id. at 827, 829. With respect to this issue, the court essentially reiterated the portions of
the Field and Nova Scotia I opinions that predicated their holdings upon the importance of the grand
jury process. See supra notes 87, 104 and accompanying text.
127 Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d 828 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 1121 and 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (1979)). As
further support for this proposition, the court quoted from a brief that had been filed with the
Jamaica Court of Appeals. The quotation was to the effect that "the Confidentiality Laws of the
Cayman Islands should not be used as a blanket device to encourage or foster criminal activities,"
from which the Nova Scotia II court concluded that the enforcement with Cayman Islands policy
against the use of its "business secrecy law" in this regard. See id. at 827-28.
128 Id. at 827-28 n.16 (citing United States v. Vetco, 644 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1981)); see
FED. R. CRim. P. 6(e).
129 Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 828 (footnotes omitted). With respect to the importance of the
"situs of the records," the court found that "[t]his position is advanced only in a tentative draft of
the Restatement" and that it "has been explicitly rejected by the State Department." Id. at n.17
(citing Compelling Discovery and Evidence in International Litigation, Address by Honorable Davis
R. Robinson, The Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, to the Bar Association of the City of
New York (Feb. 14, 1984)).
130 Nova Scotia II, 740 F.2d at 828 (quoting U.S. v. Field 532 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). The Nova Scotia I court also quoted this same passage to the same
effect. See Nova Scotia 1, 691 F.2d at 1391.
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interests of the United States in enforcing its criminal laws." '31
Although there have been decisions to the contrary, 132 the almost-inevi-
table outcome is that the interests of the foreign sovereign will be deter-
mined to be inferior to those of the United States and disclosure will be
ordered.
D. Necessity for "Compelled Consents" as an Alternative to the
Restatement Balancing Test
Given that disclosure is almost inevitable under the Restatement
balancing test, one wonders why it was necessary to invent "compelled
consents." The answer lay in the area of foreign policy and international
relations.
Although disclosure is essentially afait accompli under the Restate-
ment test, it is often achieved at the expense of amicable relations be-
tween the nations involved: "Insistence on the gathering of evidence at
131 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 260-61. See also United States v. Da-
vis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985) (U.S. interest in enforcing fraud laws outweighs interest of Cayman
Islands in banking secrecy); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, modified, 691 F.2d 1981
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981)(U.S. interest in enforcement of its revenue laws out-
weigh Swiss interest in banking secrecy); United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d
Cir. 1968) (U.S. interest in enforcement of antitrust laws outweighs German interests in bank se-
crecy); Garpeg, Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (U.S. interest in enforcing
revenue lase outweighs Hong Kong interest in bank secrecy); SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana,
92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y 1981) (U.S. interests in preventing insider trading outweighed Swiss bank
secrecy interest where Swiss bank acted in bad faith). See generally United States v. Bowe, 694 F.2d
1256 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (attorney-client privilege not sufficient to overcome interests in disclosure).
132 See, eg., United States v. First National Bank of Chicago 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983);
Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960). In the First National Bank case, the IRS issued a
summons to a Chicago bank; the summons required production of the bank statements of a customer
whose funds were located in the bank's Athens branch. First National Bank, 699 F.2d at 324. The
bank refused to furnish the information, asserting that "under the Greek Bank Secrecy Act, any and
all of [its] employess- whether in Greece of elsewhere-who reveal[ed] exact account information
about depositors of [the] Branch in Athens to any third party [could] be subject ... to criminal
penalties, including.., not less than a six-month prison sentence." Id.
The IRS then fied a petition seeking to enforce the summons; after the district court ordered
compliance, First Chicago appealed to the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 342-43. The Seventh Circuit
applied the Restatement balancing test and found that the district court's order compelling produc-
tion was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 345. The court distinguished the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in Nova Scotia I on three grounds: (1) that the court of appeals had the benefit of findings by the
district court, including a finding that the bank had not "made a good faith effort to comply with the
subpoena"; (2) that subpoena sought information as an incident to "a tax and narcotics investigation
so that the interest of the United States in the investigation and enforcement of its criminal laws was
involved as well as its interest in [the] determination and collection of taxes"; and (3) that "[t]he
foreign law.., was different ... in that disclosure with the consent of the customer would not be a
criminal offense and the power of a Bahamian court to permit disclosure did not appear to be as
strictly limited" as under Greek law. Id. at 347. See also Minpeco, S.A., v. Conticommodity Serv-
ices, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying the balancing test and denying a motion to
compel in the context of civil litigation).
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all costs may win U.S. prosecutors some cases, but it is making enemies
of many otherwise friendly foreign governments."' 33 That is, while U.S.
"law enforcement officials [view their] subpoenas [as] a legitimate and
direct means of obtaining information[,] ... many foreign governments
consider... subpoenas issued to persons outside the United States as
intrusive and an infringement on their sovereignty." 134
While it is possible to address these issues through other means,' 35
"compelled consents" provide a useful alternative to the Restatement in
that they eliminate the necessity for "balancing" the interests of the re-
133 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 265. 'Third-party witnesses caught in a
conflict between the laws of two countries are certain to become increasingly annoyed at their unten-
able position and may lobby foreign governments for even stronger blocking and bank secrecy laws."
Id.
134 Id. at 301. The D.C. Circuit addressed this issue recently in In Re: Sealed Case, slip op.,
case no. 87-5208. 87-5209 (D.C. Cir., Aug. 7, 1987). The appeals were from district court orders
"compelling appellants, a bank and an individual, to respond to a grand jury subpoena by producing
documents and giving testimony." Id. The bank was "owned by the government of Country X",
while the individual was "a citizen of country X" who was "currently employed as the manager of
the bank's agency in a city in the United States." Id. The manager also had "significant family and
property connections to Country Y." Id.
The manager argued that requiring him to comply with the subpoena violated the fifth amend-
ment in that "Country Y could [thereupon] convict him of a crime... for revealing information
protected by [its] bank secrecy law." Id. The court rejected this argument because it found that such
a conviction could only result from the manager's "own voluntary act- returning to Country Y."
Id. Since he no longer resided in that country, the privilege did not apply to "protect against dan-
gers voluntarily assumed." Id.
With regard to the bank, however, the court held that the district court erred in compelling
compliance with the subpoena. Id. "The subpoena sought bank documents created and held in the
bank's branch office in Country Y." Id. To enforce the subpoena, therefore, would be to require the
bank to violate "the laws of Country Y on Country Y's soil." Id. The court found that this was
unacceptable under "basic principles of international comity": "We have little doubt.., that our
government and our people would be affronted if a foreign court tried to compel someone to violate
our laws within our borders." Id. The court also found that the act of state doctrine, and attendant
concerns, provided "good reason for courts not to act on their own... when their actions may
hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of
nations as a whole in the international sphere." Id. (quoting Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964)). The court felt that such matters were more appropriately resolved by the
legislative and/or executive branches, and noted that is was "also relevant.., that the grand jury
[was] not left empty-handed" by its decision, given that the bank manager was "available... to
testify as to many of the facts that the grand jury may wish to ascertain." Id.
135 If potentially major international conflicts are to be avoided, the United States must begin
to take a long-term view of the problem, including expansion of and adherence to bilateral and
multilateral agreements, encouragement of foreign countries to improve their domestic laws while at
the same time taking into account their respective national priorities, and exploration of the possibil-
ity of enacting uniform laws.
In the short term, the United States government must engage in a "balancing test" of its own to
determine when its insistence on obtaining foreigh evidence at all costs is worth the potential diplo-
matic problems that may ensue.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 3, at 265.
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spective sovereignties.136  By eliminating this necessity, "compelled con-
sents" allow extraterritorial discovery to proceed while minimizing
adverse effects on diplomatic relations.
III. "COMPELLED CONSENTS": THE FIFH AMENDMENT AND THE
FORCED PRODUCTION OF FOREIGN BANKING AND
COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTS
This part addresses: (1) the relationship between the fifth amend-
ment guarantee against compelled self-incrimination and the act of pro-
ducing documentary evidence; and (2) the extent to which the execution
of a "compelled consent" is analogous to the act of producing documen-
tary evidence, for fifth amendment purposes.
A. The "'Act of Production" Doctrine137
The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself... In
1886, the U.S. Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States'39 extended the
protections of the privilege to the act of producing documentary evi-
dence, holding that the compulsory production of such evidence is the
functional equivalent of requiring an individual to be a witness against
himself and is, therefore, an act which is encompassed by the privilege."4
136 See, e.g., id. at 265 n.120 (citing Garpeg, Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) and United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814 (11th Cir 1984)).
137 For an overview of this doctrine, see Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the
Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REv. 1 (1987); Note, The Fifth Amendment and Production of
Documents after United States v. Doe, 66 B.U.L. REv. 95 (1986).
138 U.S. CONST. amend. V. For the history of the privilege against self incrimination, see L.
LAVY, ORGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968). In England the privilege arose as the result of a
rivalry that developed between the ecclesiastical courts, which untilized a self-incriminating oath as
an essential element of their procedure, and the common law courts, which "sought to restrict the
use of the intimidated procedure." Note, Compelling Signature of Consent Forms to Supply the Gov-
ernment With Foreign Bank Records Violated the Fifth Ammendment, 16 CUM. L. REV. 165, 167
(1985) [hereinafter Note, Compelling Signature] (citing M. BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 6 (1980)). The rivalry
generated
[t]he often quoted but seldom followed maximum, Licet nemo tenetur selpsom
proderer, tamen proditus per faman tenentur selpsom ostendere utrum suam innocentiam
ostemdere et selpsum (Though no one is bound to become his own accuser, yet when once a
man has been accused (pointed out as guilty by general report), he is bound to show
whether he can prove his innocence and to vindicate himself.).
Id. at 167 n.21 (quoting Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Selpsum Prodere, 5 HARv. L. REv. 71 (1981)).
139 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
140 Id. "[WMe are.., of [the] opinion that a compulsory production of the private books and
papers of [an individual] ... is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of
the [flifth [a]mendment to the Constitution." Id. at 634-35. See also id. at 630 ("any forcible and
compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to
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The Court retreated from this position in Fisher v. United States141
which was handed down in 1976. In Fisher, the Court reconsidered the
Boyd holding in light of the proposition that "the [f]ifth [a]mendment
does not independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort
of incriminating evidence but applies only when the accused is compelled
to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating."142 The
Court found that the contents of documentary evidence do not constitute
compelled testimony and are not, therefore, encompassed by the amend-
ment's right against compelled self-incrimination.143
It also held, however, that "[t]he act of producing evidence in re-
sponse to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects, wholly
aside from the contents of the papers produced."'" The Fisher Court
found that production can "tacitly concede [a] the existence of the papers
demanded, [b their possession or control by the... [individual to whom
the subpoena is addressed, and (c)] also would indicate the [individual's]
belief that the papers are those described in the subpeona." 145
Based upon this finding, the Court concluded that although "[t]he
elements of compulsion are clearly present [in such a situation,] the more
difficult issues are whether these tacit [concessions] are both 'testimonial'
and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the [f]ifth [a]mendment.""
It then held that the "resolution [of these issues] ... depend[s] on the
facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof," so that no
"categorical answers" are possible.147
convict him of [a] crime or to forfeit his goods is within the condemnation of" the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination).
141 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
142 Id. at 408. In a succeeding passage, the Court illustrated the significance of a compelled
"testimonial" communication by noting that it had "declined to extend the protection of the privi-
lege to the giving of blood samples, to the giving of handwriting exemplars, voice exemplars, or
donning of a blouse worn by the perpetrator." Id., (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
763-64 (1966); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 222-23 (1967); and Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910)).
143 "Mhe preparation of all of the papers sought... was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be
said to contain compelled testimonial evidence, either of the taxpayers or of anyone else." Fisher,
425 U.S. at 409-10 (footnote omitted). "[B]y definition, the contents of such records are not com-
pelled testimony, because they were created before the government sught to force their production as
evidence." Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The After-
math of Fisher v. United States, 95 HAv. L. REV., 683, 685 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Criminal
Defendants]. Boyd indicated that the contents of documents were protected by the privilege. Boyd,
116 U.S. at 630. Subsequent decisions supported this construction of the Boyd holding. See, eg.,
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763-64.
144 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
145 Id. at 410 (citing Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)).
146 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
147 Id. at 410. The Court then proceeded to analyze the "facts and circumstances of the partic-
ular case[]" that was before it, and held that "compliance with a summons directing [a] taxpayer to
467
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Several years later in United States v. Doe,148 the Court returned to
this issue: the question was whether the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion encompasses the contents of the business records of a sole proprie-
torship. The Court found that the contents are not so protected,1 49 but
reiterated that production is privileged so long as it has "testimonial as-
pects and incriminating effect."1 50 Doe, therefore, "firmly established
that the fifth amendment is violated only if the defendant's conduct is
compelled, testimonial, and incriminating." ' 1
B. Execution of "Compelled Consents"
The decisions which have addressed the use of "compelled con-
sents" have split. The issue is whether the "consent" violates the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This part examines
these decisions.
1. No Fifth Amendment Violation
United States v. Ghidoni 52 was the first decision to examine "com-
pelled consents." As noted above,15 3 the case arose from Ghidoni's re-
fusal to execute a consent directive, or "compelled consent," that would
have permitted U.S. law enforcement agents to obtain records from his
produce [his] accountant's documents... involve[s] no incriminating testimony within the protec-
tion of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 410, 414. See also infra pt. IV(B).
148 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
149 Id. at 612. The reasoning was as follows: Respondent does not contend that he prepared
the documents involuntarily or that the subpoena would force him to restate, repeat, or reaffirm the
truth of their contents." Id. at 611-12 (footnotes omitted). Absent such preparation and/or affirma-
tion, the privilege does not apply: "[Tihe [flifth [a]mendment only protects the person ... from
compelled self-incrimination. Where the preparation of business records is voluntary, no compulsion
is present." Id. at 612 (citation omitted).
150 Id. at 612. See also id. at 612 ("[a]lthough the contents of a document may not be privi-
leged, the act of producing the document may")(citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410). The Court's holding
was, however, limited to the contents of business, as opposed to personal, records, although certain of
the justices were split on this issue. Compare Doe, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring)("the
Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any kind")
with 465 U.S. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(Doe opinion did not
"reconsider [H whether the Fifth Amendment provides protection for the contents of "private papers
of any kind"). These and other ambiguities in Doe led one judge to characterize the opinion as
offering "amphibolic guidance [which consigns] ...the lower federal courts ... discerning the
present state of the law surrounding the fifth amendment privilege [to the role of] tea leaves reader'.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Served Feb. 27, 1984, 599 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (E.D. Wash. 1984)
(quoting United States v. Karp, 484 F. Supp. 157, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
151 Moesteller, supra note 137, 6-7 (1987)(footnote omitted). It is not necessary that "[t]he
item demanded.., be testimonial in nature." Id. at 7 n.15. "The relevant question is whether the
act of producing the item is itself testimonial." Id.
152 732 F.2d 814 (1lth Cr.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984).
153 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
Vol. 20:435
COMPELLED CONSENT
Cayman Islands bank."54
Ghidoni's refusal was predicated upon the contention that "com-
pelled execution of the directive would violate his right against self-in-
crimination."' 55 After the district court rejected his contention and held
him in contempt, Ghidoni appealed.' 56
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of Ghidoni's fifth amend-
ment claim by pointing out that he "ha[d] not asserted, nor could he
argue, that the contents of the bank records [were] eligible for protection
under the [f]ifth [a]mendment.... Rather, Ghidoni's assertion of privi-
lege centers on the alleged testimonial and incriminating aspects of his
compelled signing of the directive."'15 7
Ghidoni relied upon Fisher, arguing that "signing the directive
would have testimonial aspects, i.e., [it] "would be an implicit assertion
that the Cayman Islands bank accounts existed, were authentic, and that
he controlled them."'5 8 He also contended that "these three elements
[were] ... in dispute," so that "his compelled signing would be testimony
attesting to" them which would "form an incriminating link assisting the
government in meeting its burden of proof."' 59
The Eleventh Circuit rejected Ghidoni's arguments."6 With regard
to the first element, the court found that because "the directive state[d]
that if the accounts exist, the bank is permitted to disclose records of
those accounts to the government .... [But it] contain[ed] no implicit
154 Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 815. "In futherance of its investigation [of Ghidoni], the government
issued a subpoena to the Miami, Florida branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia, commanding produc-
tion of bank records relating to Ghidoni's accounts." Id. at 816. Bank officials "expressed concern
that production... would subject bank employees to criminal liability under the Confidential Rela-
tionships (Preservation) Law of the Cayman Islands ... [and] suggested that problems with the
Cayman Island law could be avoided if Ghidoni would execute a directive consenting to disclosure."
Id. See also supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text. "Accordingly, the government [then] ob-
tained [a] district court order compelling Ghidoni "to execute a consent directive authorizing disclo-
sure of "all information" and delivery of "all documents of every nature" relating to accounts which
he maintained at either branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 816.
155 Ghidont, 732 F.2d at 816.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 817 (citing United States v. Miller, 415 U.S. 435 (1976); California Bankers Ass'n v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974) (citation and footnotes omitted). The citations were apparently ap-
pended in support of the proposition that "[it is well-established [that] bank records are not pro-
tected form disclosure by any constitutional privilege." Id. (citation omitted). The above-quoted
comments are followed by a lengthy quotation from the Fisher opinion, the import and significance
of which apparently is to establish that "[t]he elements of compulsion [were] clearly present "on the
facts which were before the court, given that these facts involved the enforcement of a subpoena
requiring the production of certain documents. Id. (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
411 (1976)).
158 Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 818.
159 Id. (footnote omitted). Ghidoni's contentions are, of course, predicated upon the test
which was enunciated in Fisher. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. See also infra pt. IV(B).
160 Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 818.
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testimony that the records [did] in fact exist." '' With regard to control,
it found (a) that "Ghidoni... denied control over any accounts with the
bank"' 6 2 and (b) that "the directive [did] not contradict this testimonial
assertion"' 63 in that it "[made] no explicit statement regarding" his con-
trol thereof. 64
With regard to the third and final element of the Fisher test, 6- the
court found that "only the bank could authenticate the records at is-
sue."' 6 Thus, Ghidoni's execution of the consent directive could not
yield a testimonial assertion to this effect. The court concluded that, be-
cause the account records were held by the bank, "any testimony on
[their] existence, control or authentication... would have to come from
161 Id. ("nothing in the directive implies that such accounts exist").
162 Id.
163 Id. (footnote omitted).
164 Id. "Rather the directive merely permits the bank to disclose information relating to any
accounts' with respect to which the bank records indicate Ghidoni's authority to draw (i.e., any
accounts with respect to which the bank thinks Ghidoni has authority)." Id.
In other words, we read the directive as equivalent to a statement by Ghidoni that,
although he expresses no opinion with regard to the existence of or his control over any
such accounts, he is authorizing the bank to disclose information relating to accounts
which, in the bank's opinion (or with respect to which the bank records indicate), Ghidoni
controls.
Id. at 818 n.8. The court then concluded that "[b]ecause the directive contains no statement by
Ghidoni on either control or existence of the accounts, the directive could not be used by the govern-
ment as an admission thereof." Id. at 818 (footnote omitted). This conclusion is accompanied by a
note in which the court indicates that its finding in this regard is not to be construed as "affording
Ghidoni any constructive immunity regarding subsequent use of the directive . . . . Rather, we
simply hold that the directive in the instant case lacks any probative testimonial value on the issue of
control or existence." Id. at 818 n.9 (citation omitted). The reference of "constructive immunity"
was a reference to the Doe case, which rejected the government's proposed "doctrine of constructive
use immunity... [u]nder [which]... the courts would impose a requirement on the Government
not to use the incriminatory aspects of the act of production... even though the statutory proce-
dures [for granting such immunity] have not been followed." Doe, 465 U.S. at 616. See also supra pt.
III(A).
165 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. Before proceeding to the third element, the
court intejected the following observation: "Because the directive contain[ed] no statement by
Ghidoni on either control or existence of the accounts, [it] could not be used by the government as
an admission thereof." Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 818 (footnote omitted). In the omitted note, the court
was careful to explain that it was not "affording Ghidoni any 'constructive immunity' regarding
subsequent use of the directive [but was, instead,] simply hold[ing] that the directive in the istant
case lack[ed] any probative testimonial value on the issue of control or existence." Id. at 818 n.9
(citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984)) (citation omitted).
166 Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 819.
In this regard, the case is indistinguishable from Fisher, where the government was
seeking records prepared by an accountant for the defendant. Because the [defendant]
could not authenticate the accountant's work papers or reports by oral testimony, the
Court held that the [defendant's] production of those accounts would not assist in
authentication.
Id. at 818-19 (citation omitted).
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the records themselves and the bank officials."167
This decision would allow Ghidoni to execute the directive and
"still maintain that the records do not exist, that he does not control
them, and that they are not authentic." '168 Therefore, "[t]hese factors
demonstrate[d] the nontestimonial nature of the consent directive."'16 9
In his dissent, Judge Clark analogized the execution of a consent
directive to the act of providing a handwriting exemplar: in that it "pro-
vide[d] the government with no more than the truism that Ghidoni can
write, and that what he has furnished is his signature." 170 He contended
that both involved the act of "producing the writing,"'' and did not find
it significant that the directive authorized the release of foreign bank
records to the government.' 72
The distinction lay in the use to which the directive would be put:
Judge Clark stressed that, "[tihe government is seeking more than the
physical characteristics of the witness' handwriting.' . . . Rather, it is
seeking to obtain... a signature on an incriminating document.' ",173
Although conceding that the directive did not admit "that any for-
eign account exists, or that any records... are genuine," he found that
167 Id. at 819.
168 Id. at 810 (footnote omitted). The Court did note that "[Ghidoni's testimony] on these
issues would likely run up against the clear existence of due records and the probable bank testimony
that [he] controlled the accounts and the records were authentic. Nevertheless, [it concluded,] no
testimonial statement in the directive contradict[ed] his... position regarding the accounts." Id. at
819 n.10.
169 Id. at 819 (footnote omitted). In the omitted note, the court distinguished Ghidoni's situa-
tion from that at issue in United States v. Doe. Whereas the Doe Court had the benefit of a district
court's finding "as a factual matter that the ... compelled production of records was testimonial and
incriminated [,the Ghidon] district court found that the directive was not testimonial." Id. 819 at
n.11.
170 Judge Clark began his analysis by noting that although "compelling a handwriting exem-
plar is generally permissible [given that] the writing produced is nothing more than a nontestimonial,
physical means of identification, like a fingerprint or a voice sample." Id. at 820 (citation omitted).
There are exceptions:
[W]hen a suspect is ordered to sign a confession or to furnish a handwriting exemplar, the
focus shifts away from the act of producing the writing and toward its contents. The acts
[sic] of signing a confession or providing a handwriting sample does no more than commu-
nicate the truism that the author can write and that what he has provided [is] in his hand-
writing. It is the communicative value of what is written above his signature that is
important. Thus, coercing a suspect to evince his guilt by signing his name to the state-
ment "I confess," compels incriminating testimony and is therefore forbidden.
Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976))(citation omitted). See also id. ("The
Supreme Court has made it clear that if the writing is sought only for its physical characteristics but
also for its content, the fifth amendment prohibits its compulsion[.]").
171 Id. at 820. "Ghidoni [was] ... ordered ... to sign his name, [an act] which present[ed] a
situation closer.., to... the exemplar cases, than to the production of document cases.. . ." Id.
172 Id. at 820. Cf. infia pt. IV(B).
173 Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 820 (quoting United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22 (1973)).
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this was "beside the point." 174
Ghidoni is not being asked to produce bank records, and so the testi-
monial aspects attendant to compelling the act of producing such
records, articulated in Doe, are irrelevant here. We are concerned not
with the act of producing records or the act of signing a consent form,
but with the substance of the consent form itself, which communicates
to all banks presented with the form: "I consent to have you release
any account information you deem applicable to me." 175
Judge Clark then concluded that execution of the directive "constitute[d]
compelled testimony" which was incriminating "in that it fumishe[d] a
link in a chain leading to procurement of the documents that the govern-
ment intend[ed] to use to secure Ghidoni's conviction." 176
The Fifth Circuit adopted the Ghidoni holding in United States v.
Cid. 17 7 Cid appealed a district court order requiring that he comply with
a grand jury subpoena "by executing a consent, directed to 'any bank or
trust company at which I have a bank account,' for the production of
bank records." 178 Cid's "objection [was] that the compulsion offend[ed]
his [f]ifth [a]mendment privilege." 179
174 Id. at 820-21.
175 Id. at 821.
176 Id. at 821 (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951)). In an earlier portion of
the opinion, the judge noted that "Ghidoni [was] being ordered to sign a statement authorizing any
foreign bank with which he ha[d] an account to release his records to the government upon demand,
records which the government could not obtain without his 'consent."' Id. at 820. The majority
rejected Judge Clark's analysis (a) because they concluded that "the handwriting cases do provide
significant support for our holding," and (b) because they found that there was "an even closer
analogy between the act of production cases and the act of executing the consent directive. Id. at
819 n.12.
The Eleventh Circuit followed Ghidoni recently in United States v. Lehder-Rivas, 827 F.2d 682
(1 lth Cir. 1987). In that case, the government sought an order compelling Lehder-Rivas to execute
a directive "authorizing the Bahamas Office of the Bank of Nova Scotia to produce... all docu-
ments described" in an accompanying grand jury subpoena. Id. at 683. The directive "included a
statement that it had been executed pursuant to a court order." Id. After the court entered the
requested order, Lehder-Rivas appealed, asserting that the execution of such directives violates the
fifth amendment tight against compelled self-incrimination, and that the Eleventh Circuit erred in
Ghidoni when it held to the contrary. Id.
Not suprisingly, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument in a cursory opinion: "[We adhere
to our conclusion in Ghidoni that the waiver would not admit the existence of the described accounts
or transactions, or Lehder[-Rivas]'s control over them, but merely would authorize the bank to
release such information if it believes.., that... permission is necessary." Id. The court rejected
Lehder-Rivas' argument that the First Circuit's decision in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro),
814 F.2d 791 (1987), required a different result. For a discussion of the Ranauro decision, see supra
pt. III(B)(2).
177 767 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1985).
178 Id. at 1132 (Cid also appealed the district court's denial of his motion to quash the sub-
poena in question.).
179 Id.
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Although he conceded that the records were not privileged, Cid ar-
gued that the execution of the consent had
testimonial consequences, in that he would be confirming... that he
had (1) created an account or accounts revealed by the "Consent Di-
rective" (2) at an off-shore bank, otherwise "safe" from scrutiny by the
Government of the United States, and (3) had engaged in whatever
transactions the records of those accounts reflected.180
The Fifth Circuit rejected the argument because (a) it found that "the
same consent form was at issue in Ghidoni," and (b) it "agree[d] with
that court's reasoning, which needs no repetition or enlargement." 181
In addition to Ghidoni, the Cid court also relied upon a Second Cir-
cuit decision, United States v. Davis."8 2 Davis was indicted and convicted
on "various charges arising out of a scheme... which involved the pay-
ment of multi-million dollar kickbacks to executives of General Dynam-
ics Corporation ... "83 One of the issues which Davis raised in his
appeal was the constitutional permissibility of "compelled consents."
Five weeks before his trial began, the government issued a subpoena du-
ces tecum to the Cayman Islands Branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia,
directing the bank "to produce bank documents relating to accounts used
by Davis in furtherance of his kickback and laundering operations."18 4
Because the subpoena implicated the Cayman Islands statute which was
at issue in Ghidoni, the government was concerned that Davis "would
seek to prevent the Bank from obtaining an order from the Cayman
Grand Court which would allow the Bank to comply with the
subpoena. '185
"Accordingly, the Government moved for an order directing Davis
not to interfere... with the compliance efforts of the Bank and to exe-
cute a direction to authorize compliance by the Bank. .. ."86 The dis-
180 Id.
181 Id. at 1133 (citing United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.
CL 328 (1984)). The circuit reached an identical result in a companion case. See In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, Thier, 767 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Thier]. "The consent form which
Thier is directed to sign is virtually identical to that set forth in the opinion of this date in [Cid]. As
in that case, we reject the [fjifth [a]mendment claim." Id. at 1134.
182 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985).
183 Id. at 1026.
184 Id. at 1032.
185 Id. "Under Cayman Law, disclosure of bank records is generally prohibited, but a cus-
tomer's records may be disclosed if the customer consents or if the Cayman Grand Court orders
disclosure." Id. (citing Cayman Confidential Relationships (Preservation) Law, discussed supra pt.
II(A)). The government was concerned despite the fact that "the Bank and the Cayman Islands
authorities were disposed to comply" with the subpoena. Id.
186 Id. The requested order also required that Davis not" 'object, engage in litigation, or other-
wise seek to delay or hinder production of documents in response to said subpoena."' Id. at 1032-
33.
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trict court ordered Davis (a) to " 'take whatever steps [were] necessary to
allow the Bank... to comply with the subpoena'... [ and (b)] to sign a
form directing the Bank to produce the records."' 7 The order "pro-
vided that the directive could not be used against Davis at trial either to
authenticate the bank records or otherwise." '188
"Davis signed the directive, ceased his litigation in the Cayman Is-
lands, and disclosure was made pursuant to an order of the Cayman
Grand Court." '89 After he was convicted, Davis argued that the order
compelling him to execute the directive violated the fifth amendment
prohibition against self-incrimination.' 9
The Second Circuit began its consideration of this argument by not-
ing that the fifth amendment privilege "applies only when the accused is
compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminat-
ing."' 191 It found that "[slince the only communication which Davis
himself was compelled to make was the direction to the bank, that direc-
tion is the only possible source of a [f]ifth [a]mendment violation."' 92
The court concluded that the issue was controlled by Fisher 93
which held that it was not a violation of the fifth amendment to require a
taxpayer to produce his accountant's workpapers: "[S]ince the
workpapers were not prepared by the taxpayer and contained no testimo-
nial declaration by him, the taxpayer could not be said to have been com-
pelled to make any testimonial communications."' 19a
The Davis court held that this reasoning disposed of the issue: "The
bank records were prepared by the bank and contained no testimonial
communications by Davis."' 95 It also applied Fisher to reject Davis' ar-
gument that the directive constituted "compelled testimonial evidence' ":
"[t]he Bank voluntarily prepared these business records and thus no
compulsion was present."'' 96
The court qualified its holding by noting that "[e]ven though the
contents of the bank records were not privileged, Davis' direction author-
izing the disclosure of the records might have had communicative aspects
187 Id. at 1033.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. Davis also argued (a) "that the records were obtained in violation of Cayman law, [and
(b)] that the district court improperly ordered him to cease his Cayman Islands litigation." Id.
191 Id. at 1039 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976)).
192 Id.
193 Fisher, 425 F.2d at 391. See supra pt. III(A).
194 Davis, 767 F.2d at 1039 ("In addition, since the preparation of the workpapers was wholly
voluntary, there was no 'compelled' testimonial evidence." Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. at 409-10.).
195 Id.
196 Id. See also supra note 193.
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of its own." 197 It found, however, that because the district court's "care-
fully crafted order specifically provided that the [g]overnment could not
use the directive as an admission that the bank accounts existed, that
Davis had control over them, or for any other purpose," it did not consti-
tute a testimonial communication within the compass of the privilege.198
Neither the Ghidoni nor the Cid directive explicitly incorporated lan-
guage to this effect. 199
The Northern District of New York employed a rather different
analysis to reach a similar result in United States v. Browne.2 °° The case
involved a motion to compel Browne to execute a consent directive.201
Browne resisted, arguing that execution of the directive would violate her
fifth amendment right to be free from compelled self-incrimination." 2
After noting that "[b]ank records per se are not constitutionally pro-
tected" by that amendment,2"3 the district court cited Davis, for the
proposition that the "release authorizing the disclosure of defendants'
bank accounts [might] have communicative aspects of its own which the
fifth amendment would prohibit.""2 4 The court then cited Ghidoni for
the subordinate proposition that "communicative aspects" exist only if
"[a]ll three [Fisher] factors [are] present in the 'consent' form."20 5
197 Davis, 767 F.2d at 1040 (emphasis added).
198 Id. "rhese limitations on the use of the direction obviate[d] any claim of testimonial com-
pulsion." Id.
199 See Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 815 n.l; Cid, 767 F.2d at 1132 n.l. The directives utilized in these
cases did include a statement to the effect that the consent was executed pursuant to an order issued
by a federal district court.
200 624 F.Supp. 245 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
201 Id. at 247. Helen and Clifford Browne "were indicted for failing to disclose the existence of
foreign bank accounts." Id. The motion to compel followed unsuccessful government efforts "to
obtain records of these accounts without [the] defendants' assistance." Id. The records at issue were
located in Switzerland and in Canada. Id. "The government moved to compel both defendants to
sign the releases." However, Clifford Browne then died, so Helen became the sole object of the
government's attention. Id. at 247 n.1.
202 Id. at 247. She also argued that the execution of release "would violate her constitutional
rights under the fourth.... sixth and thirteenth amendments." Id. (footnote omitted).
203 Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) and California Bankers Ass'n v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974)).
204 Id. at 248. The court also cited United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), and Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), as supporting this proposition. The release in question "would
[have] permit[ted] the government to obtain bank records of only those accounts over which Mrs.
Browne had control either jointly or individually. It could not operate to release records of accounts
over which the deceased Mr. Browne had exclusive control." Id. at 247 n.l. A copy of the release is
appended to the decision. See id. at 250. The release is very similar to the directive which was at
issue in Ghidoni; it does not, however, include a statement to the effect that it was executed pursuant
to an order of a federal district court.
205 Id. at 248. The three Fisher factors are, of course, that the individual is "compelled to
make a testimonial communication that is incriminating." Fisher, 425 U.S. at 408, quoted in
Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 816; Browne, 624 F. Supp. at 248.
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With respect to the first factor, the Browne court found that the
element of compulsion is met whenever a court order requires that an
individual such as Browne sign a" 'consent' form after she has refused to
do so voluntarily."20 6 With respect to the second factor, it found that a
directive will "be deemed testimonial" if an individual's execution of the
form attested "to the bank records' existence, authenticity, or [her] con-
trol over the records."2 °7  The court then held that "the consent form
presented by the [g]overnment" could not "be deemed testimonial" be-
cause it "was [too] broadly worded" to constitute an attestation to any of
these matters.208
With respect to the third factor, the court felt that the issue of in-
crimination was "a more troubling question."20 9 Although "[i]t could be
said that the release [was] incriminating in that 'it furnishe[d] a link in
the chain leading to the procurement of documents that the government
intend[ed] to use to secure [her] conviction,' "210 the court held
otherwise:
While a waiver... will lead to the production of records which the
government intends to use to obtain [Browne's] conviction, this is not
self incrimination.... [T]he consent would merely operate to "remove
an obstacle" to the production of foreign bank records which obstacle
is created by foreign law .... [T]herefore, requiring defendant to sign
the proposed consent form does not violate [her] fifth amendment
rights.
2 1 1
206 Browne, 624 F. Supp. at 248 (citing Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 816).
207 Id. (citing Doe, 465 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410)).
208 The consent form ... does not state that any accounts in the name of defendant exist.
Therefore, if banks produce records of accounts held in the name of defendant, the Gov-
ernment has not relied upon the 'truth-telling' of the defendant's signed release to demon-
strate the existence of these records.... The release ... does not contain an admission...
that defendant exercises control over any of the accounts for which the Government will
request the bank records. As in Ghidoni the release permits the banks to make their own
determination of whether defendant exercises control over any accounts in the particular
bank....
The last element.., is... authenticity.... [O]nly the banks can authenticate their
own records; this situation is unlike those cases in which the individuals are required to
produce records which they have maintained themselves.... Because the release is not
testimonial defendant may not properly invoke the fifth amendment to refuse to sign the
consent form presented by the government.
Id. at 248 (citations omitted). See infra pt. IV(B).
209 Id. at 249.
210 Id. (quoting Judge Clark's dissent in Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 821). "Stated differently, the
release allowing the banks to produce bank records of defendant's accounts may compel defendant
to add to the sum total of the Government's information.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Fox, 721
F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1983)).
211 Id. at 249. (citing United States v. Quigg, Crim. No. 80-41-1, slip op. at 5 (D. Vt. Jan. 5,
1981)). In Browne, the court found (a) that "[a] determination of incrimination is confined to
whether the communication compelled to be made by the individual is itself incriminating... [and
(b) that because Mrs. Browne did] "not acquire any rights under foreign bank secrecy laws which
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As had Ghidoni, Cid and Davis, Browne argued that the execution
of the directive was incriminating because it "furnish[ed] a link in the
chain leading to the procurement of" evidence which could be used to
obtain a conviction. This is essentially a "but for" argument: "but for"
the execution of the directive, the government would not be able to ob-
tain the evidence necessary for a conviction.
Unlike the Ghidoni, Cid and Davis courts, the Browne court elected
to reject this argument by minimizing the "but for" significance of the
directive.212 It reasoned as follows: (a) the execution of the release
would allow the government to obtain documents which it could not
otherwise obtain due to the operation and effects of "foreign bank secrecy
laws"; (b) because U.S. courts are not bound to honor "foreign bank
secrecy laws," '213 these laws gave Browne no basis for refusing to execute
the directive;214 and (c) because Browne could not rely upon these laws
as justifying her refusal to execute the directive, no fifth amendment con-
sequences attached to prevent such an execution.
Although not styled as such, the Browne court's analysis is reminis-
cent of the "balancing test" which was discussed in part II(B) of this
Article.21 5 Like that test, the Browne court's test focuses on the extent to
which a bank depositor has a cognizable privacy interest in his account
records; and like that test, it rejects privacy interests created and guaran-
teed by "foreign bank secrecy laws" in favor of the interests of U.S. law
enforcement officials. 216 The defensibility of this aspect of the Browne
opinion is a matter which is considered in part IV(B).217
are cognizable in [U.S.] courts .... [she could not] invoke the fifth amendment to refuse to waive
these rights' by signing the proposed consent form." Id. (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S.
727, 732 n.4 (1980)). Both the second finding and the comments quoted above are predicated upon
an obvious misunderstanding of the point which was at issue, i.e., whether the execution of the
consent directive was a testimonial communication which "furnishe[d] a link in the chain leading to
the procurement of documents that the government intend[ed] to use to secure [Mrs. Browne's]
conviction". Id. (citing United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 819, 821 (Clark, J., dissenting)). See
infra pt. IV(B).
212 The Ghidoni and Davis courts, of course, upheld their directives because each court found
that the execution of a consent directive did not constitute "testimonial communication" within the
meaning of the fifth amendment. See Ghidoni 732 F.2d at 818; Davis, 767 F.2d at 1039-40. The Cid
court, of course, merely adopted the Ghidoni holding. See Cid, 767 F.2d at 1133. Although the
Browne court also found that the execution of such a directive did not constitute "testimonial com-
munication" within the meaning of that amendment, it also addressed the issue of incrimination.
See Browne, 624 F. Supp. at 248. For a discussion of the utility of the "but for" standard in this
context, see infra pt. IV(B).
213 Browne, 624 F. Supp. at 249 (citing United States v. Quigg, Crim. No. 80-41-1, slip op. at 5
(D. Vt. Jan. 5, 1981)).
214 Id. (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. at 732 n.4 (1980)).
215 This test, of course, involves the application of § 40 of the Restatement (Second) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965). See supra pt. 11(B).
216 See supra pt. II(C).
217 See infra note 379.
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The Second Circuit added an important qualification to the use of
"compelled consents" in United States v. A Grand Jury Witness ("Alex-
ander").218 The case arose after a former mayor of Syracuse, New York,
"suspected of improperly using his office to receive kickbacks and other
extortionate payments ' 219 received a grand jury subpoena requiring him
to execute a consent directive.220
After unsuccessfully moving to quash,22 1 Alexander executed the di-
rective "but only after adding the phrase '(e)xecuted under protest' above
the signature line.",222 The government moved to have him held in con-
tempt, and the district court convened a hearing on that motion. 23
Alexander argued that his execution of the directive complied with
the provisions of the district court's order in that the phrase "under pro-
test" (a) did not diminish the effectiveness of the directive, and (b) "did
nothing more than ensure that the document was not a false document"
by explicitly indicating that it was the product of "compelled con-
sent.",224 The district court disagreed, directing him "to sign the docu-
ment without any limiting language' 225 and denying his request that
"the document reflect that it was signed pursuant to the court's
order.
226
Alexander refused to comply and was held in contempt; he then
appealed to the Second Circuit, which reversed. 2 7 Although rejecting
218 811 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1987) [hereinafter Alexander].
219 Id. at 115.
220 Id. Alexander was the target of the investigation. Id. The directive "provided... that
Alexander authorized any financial institution at which he had an account to disclose that informa-
tion, including copies of all documents with certificates of authenticity, to any agent or employee of
the [U.S.] government." Id. The prosecutor "frankly stated that the 'subpoena... [was] issued to
facilitate the grand jury's securing information from certain foreign financial institutions in which
[Alexander] deposited assets which are believed to be proceeds of the extortion/kickback scheme
now under investigation.'" Id.
The directive is reproduced in the opinion; it did not indicate that it was executed pursuant to
an order from a federal district court or under any other form of compulsion. See id.
221 "[IThe district court denied the motion and ordered Alexander to comply with the sub-
poena." Id.
222 Id. at 116.
223 Id.
224 Id. With regard to the latter proposition, Alexander's counsel argued that
[w]hat this man simply said is that he would not sign something that was false. And if
he signed it, without appending those words, it would be false because it speaks in terms of
consent which is not his consent, he simply puts on here that fact that it is executed under
protest.
Id.
225 Id. The court accepted the government's argument that "the added language might affect
the validity of the [directive] in the eyes of foreign financial institutions and might, therefore, impede
the grand jury's investigation." Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
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the argument that the directive contravened the fifth amendment prohi-
bition against self-incrimination,228 the court was intrigued by "Alexan-
der's contention that he [was] being forced... to sign a patently false
document." 229
It noted that Ghidoni had advanced a similar argument: "[he]
claimed 'that his signing the consent directive would constitute a due
process violation by forcing him to make a false communication. He
assert(ed) that his signature, evincing consent to the bank's disclosure,
would be a sworn misstatement because he does not consent to disclo-
sure.' "230 The Ghidoni court rejected this argument because the direc-
tive which was at issue in that proceeding included the statement that it
was "executed pursuant to that certain order of the [U.S.] District Court
for the Northern District of Florida." '231
No such statement appeared in the Alexander directive; indeed, the
government had actively opposed its inclusion on the theory that "it rep-
resented nothing more than a back door effort to warn the banks not to
comply. '232 The Second Circuit disagreed, holding that "it was im-
proper to bring the considerable sanction of contempt to bear as part of a
procedure which would conceal the true nature of the purported 'Con-
sent Directive.' "233
The court did not, however, find that the impropriety rose to the
level of a constitutional violation.234 Instead, it chose to "exercise [its]
supervisory power over the district courts.., to preclude the use of this
form of consent directive, ' 235 holding that the directive would have been
acceptable "either if it indicated that it was being executed pursuant to
court order or if Alexander had been permitted to indicate that he
228 Id. at 116-17. The court applied its own decision in Davis, and the Eleventh Circuit's deci-
sion in Ghidoni, to hold that the directive did not constitute "testimonial communication" within the
compass of the privilege. See id.
229 Id. at 117. Alexander argued "that, without some express statement that his consent has
not been voluntarily given, the document is fraudulent on its face." Id.
In addition to his fifth amendment argument, Alexander contended
that he [was] being forced to sign a false document because it [did] not provide that his
consent was coerced; ... that he properly refused to respond before the grand jury because
he had been subjected to illegal electronic surveillance; and.., that the form of consent
[was] deficient because it authorize[d] disclosure to any employee of the government in
contravention of the general rule on grand jury secrecy codified in Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e).
Id. at 116.
230 Id. at 117 (quoting Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 818 n.7).
231 See id. See also Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 815 n.1.
232 Alexander, 811 F.2d at 117. "On appeal, the government argued that the directive [was]
not false because it nowhere purport[ed] to be freely executed but, instead, simply direct[ed] that it
'be construed as consent.'" Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 118.
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'[e]xecuted [the directive] under protest.' ,236
Because this holding was predicated upon the court's supervisory
powers, its precedential effect in other circuit courts is uncertain. At a
minimum, however, it permits the argument that, absent either of the
"indications" described above, a consent directive "offends basic precepts
of honest behavior by invoking the district court's imprimatur on a docu-
ment that would be misleading. 2 37
The Second Circuit returned to this issue several months later in an
appeal which ensued after a district court held two grand jury witnesses
in contempt for refusing to execute consent directives.238 The witnesses
argued that Davis and Alexander "conflict[ed]" with the Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Doe :239
Appellants suggest that the determination of the fifth amendment
question in those decisions rested on the fact that the government was
precluded from using the directive at trial as an admission against the
signatory of the directive. Appellants contend that we recognized in
those cases that the directives were both testimonial and incriminating,
and that by sanctioning a district court order precluding admission of
the directives into evidence, we were approving a de facto use immu-
nity-a practice forbidden by United States v. Doe .... 240
The Second Circuit rejected their argument after "clarify[ing] the
meaning of [its] prior decisions. '241  It began by reviewing the elements
necessary to establish a fifth amendment violation,2 42 and then consid-
236 Id.
237 Id. at 117-18. After stating that it had chosen to exercise its supervisory power over the
district courts to prevent such an outcome, the court noted that "[in so doing, despite our distaste
for its tactics here, we do not attempt to control the executive branch's behavior... but only that of
the district courts when requested to intervene to enforce this disingenuous practice." Id. at 118
(citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737-38 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
238 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 826 F.2d 1166, 1167 (2d. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter
Contemnors].
239 Id. at 1168 (citing United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984)). Doe, of course, rejected "the
government's proposed doctrine of constructive use immunity." 465 U.S. at 616. See also supra pt.
III(A).
240 Contemnors, 826 F.2d at 1170. The argument was predicated upon the qualification which
was appended to the Davis holding, i.e., that "Davis' direction authorizing the disclosure of the
records might have had communicative aspects of its own." Davis, 767 F.2d at 1040 (emphasis
added). The Davis opinion resolved this issue by holding that "any claim of testimonial compulsion"
on Davis' part was "obviated" by the district court's "carefully crafted order" which limited the use
that could be made of the directive. See id. See also supra note 198 and accompanying text.
The district court in the Contemnors proceeding ordered the witnesses to execute directives
which had been modified to specify "that they were being executed in compliance with a court
order." Contemnors, 826 F.2d at 1167. The order also provided that "the directives could not be
used as an admission against appellants in any subsequent trial." Id.
241 Contemnors, 826 F.2d at 1168.
242 "To establish a fifth amendment violation, appellants must... demonstrate the existence of
three elements: 1) compulsion, 2) a testimonial communication, and 3) the incriminating nature of
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ered whether the execution of consent directives "constitutes testimonial
self-incrimination."'243 It resolved this issue by utilizing the Alexander
and Ghidoni holdings with regard to determining whether a particular
act is "both 'testimonial' and 'incriminating' for purposes of applying the
[f]ifth [a]mendment." 24
Fisher enunciated the standard to be used in making such a determi-
nation. Acts will be deemed to be "testimonial" and "incriminating" to
the extent that they represent admissions of the existence, possession or
authenticity of certain documents.245 The Contemnors court announced
that, in both Davis and Alexander, it had "adopted the Eleventh Circuit's
approach toward resolving these questions as set forth in United States v.
Ghidoni."24  This holding finally and firmly committed the circuit to the
Ghidoni rationale. The execution of "compelled consents" is not a "testi-
monial assertion" and is not, therefore, encompassed by the fifth amend-
ment protection against self-incrimination.247
that communication." Id. (citing In re N.D.N.Y. Grand Jury Subpoena, 811 F.2d 114, 116 (2d Cir.
1987), which, in turn, cited United States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 1985), as
support for this proposition).
243 Id. at 1168-69. According to this opinion, Davis "did not ... decide ... whether the
communicative aspects of [such] directive[s] were either testimonial or incriminating in nature." Id.
at 1169. "[W]e rejected [Davis'] fifth amendment challenge because we found that any potential fifth
amendment problems were obviated by the fact tht the district court precluded the government from
using the directive as an admission at trial." Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1040).
See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
244 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). See Contemnors, 826 F.2d at 1169-70.
245 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410-13. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
246 Contemnors, 826 F.2d at 1169. According to this court, Ghidoni "likened [the execution of
a consent directive] to the situation presented in Doe and Fisher, where an individual was compelled
to produce ... documents himself." Id. The Contemnors court then described "the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's approach" to these issues.
The Ghidoni court... examined the directive to determine whether it contained any
testimonial assertion regarding the documents sought from the banks. The court con-
cluded that the directive was 'devoid of any testimonial aspects,' ... after it found that
'nothing in the directive imple[d] that [bank] accounts exist,' and that it contained no
statements regarding possession or control over such accounts, and that it could not be
used to authenticate any records obtained.
Id. at 1169-70 (citations omitted). The Second Circuit's characterization of Ghidoni continued with
the following comments.
The court thus concluded that compelled execution of the directive would not violate
the privilege against self-incrimination because the directive itself was not testimonial in
nature... In upholding the compelled execution of the directive, the court further ob-
served that the defendant was only being compelled to "waive a barrier [i.e., foreign states'
confidentiality laws] to permit the bank to produce documents-an act which it concluded
provided no testimonial assertions."
Id. at 1170 (citations omitted).
247 We... hold that because the directives here contain no testimonial assertions, the
district court orders compelling appellants to sign the directives provide no basis for a fifth
amendment violation. The directives here, as in Ghidoni, do not contain any assertions by
appellants regarding the existence of, or control over, foreign bank accounts. They author-
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After announcing this commitment,248 the Second Circuit rejected
the "de facto use immunity" argument.249 According to this portion of
the opinion, the proviso that the directives could not be used as an admis-
sion at trial was "merely [a] ruling on evidentiary questions relating to
materiality, relevance, prejudice, etc.",210
2. Fifth Amendment Violation
Three district court opinions have rejected the Ghidoni rationale.251
A Texas ruling issued after the government moved to compel "Texas
Doe" to execute a "compelled consent. '252
ize disclosure of records and information only if such accounts exist. We also agree with
the Ghidoni court's conclusion that the directives could not be used to authenticate any
bank records obtained.
Id.
As noted above, the court began its consideration of this issue by announcing that Davis did not
"decide whether the communicative aspects of [that] directive were either testimonial or incriminat-
ing in nature." See id. at 1169. See also supra note 243. It is difficult to reconcile this statement
with the court's subsequent observation that it had "adopted" the Ghidoni rationale "[i]n both Davis
and In re N.D.N. Y. Grand Jury Subpoena." Contemnors, 826 F.2d at 1169.
248 The court did, however, note that "[t]he Ghidoni decision is not without criticism," and
proceeded to analyze the First Circuit's decision in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814
F.2d 791 (lst Cir. 1987), which is considered infra pt. III(B)(2). See Contemnors, 826 F.2d at 1170.
The court concluded, however, that "[w]hile we see some merit in the First Circuit's approach, we
are constrained here to apply our precedent in [Alexander], and follow the analysis set forth in
Ghidoni." See id. at 1170.
249 See Contemnors, 826 F.2d at 1170. See also supra note 240 and accompanying text.
250 Contemnors, 826 F.2d at 1171.
[S]ince the directives contain no statements regarding [the] existence of, or control
over, any accounts, they should be excluded from evidence because they lack any probative
value.... We conclude... that, because the directives lack any probative testimonial
value on the issue of existence or control [of the records at issue], . . . the district court
properly excluded them from evidence.
Id. (citations omitted)(citing Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 818, n.9). This aspect of the decision is explicated
in more detail in a concurring opinion written by Judge Newman. See id. at 1171-75. Judge New-
man found that this interpretation of the Davis holding as applied by the district court in the Con-
temnors proceeding, was supported by the holding's citation to a note in the Ghidoni opinion. The
note "explicitly pointed out ... that 'use' immunity was not being conferred . . . and that the
'consent' directive was deemed not to be testimonial because it 'lack(ed) any probative testimonial
value on the issue of control or existence (of the bank records).'" Id. at 1172 (quoting Ghidoni, 732
F.2d at 818 n.9 (emphasis added in concurring opinion).
251 In re Grand Jury Investigation, Doe, 599 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. Tex. 1984) [hereinafter: Texas
Doe]; United States v. Pedro, 662 F. Supp. 47 (W.D. Ky 1987); Senate Select Comm. on Secret
Military Assistance to Iran v. Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562 (D.D.C.).
252 Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. at 746. See also supra pt. III(B)(1).
The directive would have "allow[ed] the foreign banks to supply the government with bank
records, ... consequently circumvent[ing] the foreign government's secrecy laws." Texas Doe, 599
F.Supp. at 746. "Pending before the Court is the Government's Motion to Compel John Doe to
Consent to Disclosure of Records by the Barclays Bank International, the Bank of Nova Scotia, and
the Bank of Bermuda." Id. One of the consent forms which was at issue in the proceeding is
reproduced in footnote 4 of the opinion. See id. at 748 n.4. The form did not include statements to
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Texas Doe contended that the consent "would violate his fifth
amendment privilege in that it would compel him to perform a testimo-
nial act within the meaning of the prior case United States v. Doe." '253
The government countered by arguing that the consent (a) "was analo-
gous to a compelled handwriting exemplar, which was approved by the
Supreme Court in Gilbert v. California,"'254 or (b) "would merely remove
an obstacle to the production of bank records placed there by the
respondent.
255
The court rejected both arguments, holding that the directive consti-
tuted a testimonial, incriminating communication under the standard
enunciated in Fisher.256 Its holding was predicated upon findings that
execution of the directive would admit (a) that certain accounts ex-
isted, 257 and (b) that Doe "exercised signatory authority over such ac-
counts. ' 258 These findings derived, at least in part, from the fact that
the effect (a) that it was executed pursuant to a court order, and/or (b) that it could not be used
against Doe at a trial on the merits, should an indictment be returned against him. See id. See also
supra pt. III(B)(1).
253 Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. at 747. See supra pt. III(A).
254 Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. at 747 (citing Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)). See
supra pt. III(B)(1) (for a discussion of the handwriting exemplar issue).
255 Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. at 747. See supra pt. III(B)(1) (for the source of the "merely
remove an obstacle" theory).
256 Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. at 747-48 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-11
(1976)). It appears that this court merged Fisher's discrete inquiries into the "testimonial" and
"incriminating" aspects of a communication into a single inquiry:
Whether a testimonial communication exists must be determined by the facts of each
case.... Moreover, if the act of producing supplies a necessary link in the government's
evidentiary chain, the burden of establishing that the act is a compelled testimonial commu-
nication may be satisfied. In other words, "does it confirm that which was previously un-
known to the government?"
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, and quoting United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d
1079, 1084 (6th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984)).
For a discussion of Fisher, see supra pt. III(A). For a discussion of the application of the Fisher
standard in cases which have held that the execution of "compelled consents" does not fall within
the prohibitions of the fifth amendment, see supra pt. III(B)(1). For a discussion of Schlansky, see
the treatment of United States v. Pedro, 662 F. Supp. 47 (W.D. Ky, 1987) infra notes 262-75.
257 Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. at 748. This finding is accompanied by the following footnote:
"Contra United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 817 n.4 (11th Cir. 1984). This Court has deter-
mined that the proposed forms in this case contain incriminating testimony in the contents." Id. at
748 n.5.
258 Id. at 748. This finding was accompanied (a) by the finding that the execution of the con-
sent would result in the delivery of "records of respondent's accounts or accounts he controlled,"
and (b) by the following footnote:
In a subsequent proceeding, the government could argue that since respondent exer-
cised authority over the accounts listed, he must have guilty knowledge of the contents. A
witness cannot be compelled to perform a testimonial act that would entail admission of
knowledge of the contents of potentially incriminating documents.
Id. at 748 n.6 (citation omitted). This passage concludes with a citation to In re Grand Jury Subpoe-
nas Duces Tecum, Dated June 13, 1983, and June 22, 1983, 722 F.2d 981, 987 (2d Cir. 1983). In this
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Doe had not been indicted: "[B]y compelling [him] to execute the pro-
posed consent forms, John Doe may be providing the government with
the incriminating link necessary to obtain an indictment."2 9 In a refer-
ence to the balancing test discussed in part II(B), the court noted that
"[i]f... the government requires the foreign bank records, case law has
afforded another possible remedy. 26 0
This decision was issued prior to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Cid,
discussed in part III(B)(1). Since Cid adopted the Ghidoni rationale, and
since Texas Doe was predicated upon the rejection of that rationale, one
can only conclude that the latter decision retains little, if any, preceden-
tial value.261
In United States v. Pedro,262 Ghidoni was rejected again. This ruling
issued on a Petition to Enforce an I.R.S. summons seeking to compel
Pedro to execute directives authorizing" 'any bank or trust company' to
supply the I.R.S. with bank records not otherwise obtainable." 263
Pedro argued that the consents violated his fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 2 " The court agreed,265 finding that
"[t]he principal question" was whether the directives constituted a testi-
monial communication:266 "[T]he answer.. . 'depends on whether the
decision, the Second Circuit held that a grand jury witness had "advanced a colorable claim" that
his production of certain documents would constitute an incriminating act; the witness contended
that production would establish his possession of the documents which, in turn, would permit "the
government to argue... that his removal of the documents from [a] company's files amounted to a
tacit admission that he had knowledge of their incriminating contents .... Id. at 987. The Second
Circuit remanded the matter to the district court for a factual determination as to whether the
witness' contention was well-founded. See id.
259 Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. at 748.
While the government appears to have some evidence which has been tendered for this
Court's review, the government apparently does not have enough evidence to obtain an
indictment. The government admits that the grand jury is currently investigating [Doe]
and others for various statutory violations.
Id. The court then commented that the relief which the government sought was "'precisely [the]
sort of fishing expedition that the fifth amendment was designed to prevent."' Id. (quoting United
States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1983)). This comment is followed by a citation to Bank of
Nova Scotia, 722 F.2d 657 (1lth Cir. 1983), after remand, 740 F.2d 817 (1lth Cir. 1984), which
involved the application of the Restatement "balancing test" discussed supra pt. II(B).
260 Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. at 748 n.7. See also supra note 259; infra pt. IV.
261 It was, however, cited as support for the holding in United States v. Pedro discussed infra.
See infra notes 262-75 and accompanying text.
262 662 F. Supp. 47 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
263 Id. at 48. The petition was filed by the IRS and the Department of Justice. Id.
264 Pedro "assert[ed] that compelling him to sign the consent directives [was] compelling him
to testify that the bank records exist[ed], [were] authentic, and that he controlled them." Id. at 48.
This, of course, was an invocation of the Fisher standard for determining whether or not a particular
act is "testimonial" and "incriminating" within the compass of the fifth amendment. See supra pt.
III(A).
265 Pedro, 662 F. Supp. at 49.
266 Id. at 48.
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very act of production supplies a necessary link in the evidentiary chain.
Does it confirm that which was previously unknown to the government;
e.g., the existence or location of the materials?' ,267
The court concluded that the directives were testimonial because
they "would 'confirm that which was previously unknown to the govern-
ment,'" thereby "supply[ing] a necessary link in the evidentiary
chain."26 The Pedro court distinguished Cid269 and Ghidoni27° on the
theory that the consents which were at issue in those cases "were limited
to named banks": "[i]n the present case, the consent directives are not
limited to named banks271 and the government has effectively admitted
that it does not know whether [Pedro], in fact, had foreign bank
accounts.
272
It quoted extensively from the Texas Doe opinion and followed that
decision in one particular respect: "[Pedro] has not been indicted as the
government apparently does not have enough evidence to obtain an in-
dictment"; 273 it concluded, therefore, that "compelling [him] to execute
the proposed consent forms could provide the government with the in-
criminating link necessary to obtain an indictment. " 274
After the government moved to reconsider, the court affirmed its
decision in a brief addendum which is appended to the original published
opinion.275  The only distinguishing feature of the addendum is that it
cites the Secord 276 and Ranauro 27 7 opinions as additional support for the
position which it took with regard to "compelled consents. '278 Both
267 United States v. Schalansky, 709 F.2d 1079, 1084 (6th Cir. 1983), quoted in Pedro, 662 F.
Supp. at 48 ("Schlansky ... clearly suggests that if the existence or location of the materials is
unknown and compelled production confirms the existence or location of the material is issue, then
the art (sic) of production may invoke testimonial communication.").
268 Pedro, 662 F. Supp. at 48. For a further discussion of this issue, see infra pt IV(B).
269 United States v. Cid, 767 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1985). See supra pt. III(B)(I).
270 United States v. Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1985). See supra pt. III(B)(1).
271 Pedro, 662 F. Supp. at 49. The Pedro court also distinguished United States v. Davis, 767
F.2d 1025 (1985), because "the consent directive [at issue therein] provided that it could not be used
as an admission to authenticate records." Id. at 49. See also supra pt. III(B)(1).
272 Pedro, 662 F. Supp. at 49. Because the government had "effectively admitted" that it was
uncertain as to the existence of such accounts, the court concluded that "compulsion of the proposed
consent directives would [therefore] supply a necessary link in the evidentiary chain" by confirming
the existence or nonexistence of those accounts. Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.
As Judge Bue stated [in Texas Doe]: "This is precisely [the] sort of fishing expedition
that the fifth amendment was designed to prevent."' Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. at 747
(quoting United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1983)).
Id. at 49. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text. See also infra pt. IV(B).
275 See Pedro, 662 F. Supp. at 49-50.
276 Senate Select Comm. v. Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562 (D.D.C. 1987).
277 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F. 2d 791 (1st. Cir. 1987).
278 See Pedro, 662 F. Supp. at 49-50.
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opinions are discussed immediately below.
In Secord a District of Columbia court rejected Ghidoni 279 after a
Senate Committee280 sought to compel General Richard Secord to exe-
cute a "compelled consent. ' 281 The court held that execution of the con-
sent would violate Secord's "[f]ifth [a]mendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination".282 The opinion began by noting that the
privilege "applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimo-
nial communication that is incriminating. ' 283  Because compulsion was
not an issue,284 the court turned to "the testimonial nature of the com-
munication and its incriminating effects. 285
According to the Committee, "[b]ecause the directive contain[ed] a
disclaimer by which Secord would expressly state that [it] 'shall not be
construed as admission that I am a principal of, or have any authority
with respect to, any of the listed entities or their records or accounts,' all
279 See Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562.
280 The committee was, of course, the "Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance
to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition" [hereinafter the Committee]. Secord, 664 F. Supp. at 563.
The Committee sought the proposed order under the aegis of 28 U.S.C. § 1364(b), which provides
that "[u]pon application by the Senate or any authorized committee or subcommittee of the Senate,
the district court shall issue an order to [a] ... person refusing... to comply with a subpoena... of
the committee... requiring such... person to comply forthwith." See id. at 563 n.1.
281 Id. at 563. The directive would have allowed "any bank holding an account from which he
is authorized to draw to disclose information and documents to the Committee pertaining to such
account." Id. The application came after Secord "refused to comply with an Order of the Commit-
tee to sign the directive." Id. at 563-64. This Order issued after "[the Tower Commission reported
... that General Seeord... was integrally involved in both the sale of arms to Iran and funnelling of
millions of dollars in profits to the Nicaraguan rebels, known as contras." Shenon, US. Judge Backs
Secord Bank Secrecy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1987, at 3, col. 3. Senate investigators believed that
"General Secord controlled the foreign accounts" in which the Iran-contra funds were secreted. Id.
The accounts at issue were primarily located in Switzerland. See, eg., Will Zurich Money Handlers
Ignore Senate Panel's Request?, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 27, 1987, at 29, col. 1 ("Senate investigators believe
the Swiss bank records of retired Air Force Gen. Richard V. Secord are critical to learning what
happened to funds diverted from the Iran arms sales.").
282 Secord, 664 F. Supp. at 566. In addition to contending that the consent would violate his
right against compulsory self-incrimination, Secord also argued that the forced execution of the
directive would violate (a) "his [flifth [a]mendment Due Process rights... [and (b)] his rights under
the [flirst [a]mendment." Id. at 564. He also maintained that "an extant treaty between the United
States and Switzerland regarding the disclosure of information in the context of criminal investiga-
tions and prosecutions [made] the Committee's application inappropriate." Id. (footnote omitted)
(citing Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland,
27 U.S.T 2019, T.I.A.S 8302.) "Because the Court ... hold[s] that it would violate Secord's [flifth
[a]mendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination to order him to sign the directive, his
other contentions shall not be addressed." Secord, 664 F. Supp. at 564.
283 Secord, 664 F. Supp. at 564 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976)). See
supra pt. III(A).
284 Secord, 664 F. Supp. at 564. This conclusion was based upon the fact that "the Committee
[sought] an Order of the Court forcing Secord to choose between signing the directive or suffering
the penalties of civil contempt including possible imprisonment." Id.
285 Id.
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of the testimonial elements of production... [were] removed." '286 The
court found otherwise.
Although the obtainment of documents is the Committee's goal, it is
not only the testimonial aspects of producing the documents which are
in question here.... By characterizing the directive as a tool to obtain
unprotected bank records, the Committee likens the signing of it to the
preparation of a handwriting exemplar, which is clearly non-testimo-
nia.... The difference, however, is that the directive's content is what
the Committee needs, not a sample of Secord's handwriting.... By
signing the directive, Secord would be testifying just as clearly as if he
were forced to verbally assert his content.28 7
Because it found that the directive was a testimonial communication
within the compass of the fifth amendment, the court proceeded to the
third, and final, Fisher element: whether the communication was incrimi-
nating.2"8 It found that this element, too, was present.289 The decision
286 Id. at 565. The disclaimer was designed to defeat the application of the Fisher test for the
presence of "testimonial" and "incriminating" assertions. See id.; supra pt. Ill(A).
The Committee's contention was based upon "an analogy... to cases in which documents are
sought directly from individuals in possession of them." Secord, 664 F. Supp. at 564. "In [the latter
instance], the Supreme Court has held that the [flifth [a]mendment may attach to the mere produc-
tion of the documents if there is a testimonial aspect to the production." Id. at 564-65; see also id. at
565 (citing Fisher and Texas Doe, discussed supra pt. III(A)).
287 Secord, 664 F. Supp. at 565 (citing Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) and In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Ranauro), 814 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1987)) (emphasis in original). The refer-
ence to "unprotected bank records" was followed by the observations (a) that Swiss law "require[s] a
bank to obtain the consent of its customers before releasing their records ... [and (b) ] that [Se-
cord's] protests would be of no avail if the Committee had subpoenaed a bank in the United States."
Id. at 565 (footnote omitted).
The court also noted that the directive was "false as far as Secord [was] concerned" in that he
"vigorously contest[ed] the disclosure of his bank records." Id. at 565. The Committee had argued
that the directive was not false given that it stated (a) "I direct" rather than "I consent," and
(b) "that Secord was compelled to sign it." Id. at 565 n.4. The court concluded that "[a]lIthough
these statements of fact [were] true, the intention and language of the directive [made] it clear that it
[was] to be 'construed as consent' on the part of Secord." Id. For the Second Circuit's position on
this issue, see United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985); infra pt. IV(B).
288 See supra note 284 and accompanying text. See also supra pt. III(A).
289 "The privilege... not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a convic-
tion.., but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.'" Secord, 664 F. Supp. at 566 (quoting Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1950) (citing Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950))). "To
deny a claim of privilege on the ground that the communication sought would not incriminate the
witness, a trial judge must be 'perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of ali the circumstances in
the case,... that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency to incriminate.'" Id. at 565-66
(quoting Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 488 (quoting Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 892, 898 (1881)))
(emphasis in original).
The Committee... seeks to use the consent directive to obtain Secord's foreign bank
records for use in its investigation into his allegedly criminal activities. The Committee can
only receive the records ... if the... 'consent' is adjudged to satisfy foreign bank secrecy
law. The links in the chain leading to the potentially incriminating bank records are clear,
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was not appealed.290
The First Circuit is the only circuit to have rejected Ghidoni; the
rejection came in Ranauro,291 which, like all of the cases considered in
this section, involved an appeal "from a district court order holding [an
individual] in contempt for refusing to sign a 'Direction and Consent'
form." '2 92 Like the defendants in all of those cases, Ranauro argued that
executing the directive "would amount to compelled self-incriminating
testimony" in violation of the fifth amendment. Unlike the Second, Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits, the First Circuit agreed.293 It began as those cir-
cuits did, by applying the Fisher calculus as to when the privilege ap-
plies,2 94 and immediately concluded that compulsion was not an issue.29'
It then considered the remaining issue: "whether [a] signed consent form
is a testimonial communication within the scope of the privilege. '296
After noting that the resolution of this issue "depend[s] upon the
facts and circumstances of the particular case,"2 97 the court found that
the consent directive was such a communication.
[T]he carefully drafted statement-"I consent to the production of
records in my name, if such records exist"-does not itself assert the
existence of any bank records in Ranauro's name. Nor does it admit
the authenticity of or Ranauro's control over any records which might
the first link being the signing of the directive.... The court would be completely ignoring
reality if it were to say that Secord's signature on the consent decree were not potentially
incriminating.
Secord, 664 F. Supp. at 566 (citation omitted). The omitted citation is to the Ranauro decision,
which is discussed below. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text. In an omitted portion of
the passage which is quoted above, the court noted that "[a]lso possible, albeit unlikely, is the poten-
tially incriminating use of the consent directive to authenticate the bank records produced in re-
sponse to it." 664 F. Supp. at 566. The court indicated that its holding was predicated upon the fact
that the directive included "[n]ot only.., the equivalent of the question, 'Do you consent?' ... [but]
also the affirmative answer in the form of the 23 lines of the directive." Id. See also infra pt. IV(B).
290 See Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562.
291 814 F.2d 791 (lst. Cir. 1987).
292 Id. at 792. The individual in this instance was William A. Ranauro, "who [was] being
investigated by a grand jury for possible reporting or currency violations." Id. The consent directive
"would [have] authorize[d] a Singapore bank to release any records pertaining to accounts or trans-
actions, if any," which Ranauro had had with that institution. Id. "Foreign bank secrecy law im-
pede[d] the United States from obtaining the records unless Ranauro sign[ed] the form." Id.
293 Id. at 793-96. The court reversed the contempt citation which had been entered against
Ranauro, vacated the order requiring him to execute the consent directive and remanded the matter
for proceedings not inconsistent with its holding. Id. at 796.
294 See supra note 283 and accompanying text; see also supra pt. III(A). For the court's appli-
cation of Fisher, see Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 792-93.
295 Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 792 ("It is clear that the district court's order forcing Ranauro to
choose between signing the consent form and the penalty of contempt constitutes compulsion within
the meaning of the fifth amendment.").
296 Id. at 792.
297 Id. at 793 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976)).
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be produced by the bank. It does, however, admit and assert Ranauro's
consent. The fact of Ranauro's consent is potentially incriminating, for
it could be used, before the grand jury or at trial, to prove the ultimate
facts that accounts in Ranauro's name existed or that Ranauro con-
trolled those accounts.298
Although it held that "the content of the testimonial and incrimi-
nating consent form... falls within the scope of the privilege, '299 the
court also offered an alternative rationale for refusing to require Ranauro
to execute the consent.
We also believe that we are justified in grounding our judgment
upon our supervisory powers over the administration of criminal jus-
tice within the federal courts of our circuit.... Even if the consent
form . . . were not, by itself, to be considered direct testimony by
Ranauro of his control over whatever bank accounts are produced as a
result of his execution of the form, it so closely approximates such
testimony that we believe its compelled creation and subsequently in-
criminating use would violate not only the values underlying the fifth
amendment but also the essence of our accusatorial system of
300justice.
3°
The court invoked Davis and Alexander as additional support for this
aspect of the holding:30 1 it was "troubled" because the directive did not
"indicate that it [was] being executed under the compulsion of a court
order," 3 2 and then found that, while the omission did not constitute a
due process violation,30 3 it was sufficiently egregious to preclude execu-
tion of the directive "under penalty of contempt."13 4 The opinion distin-
298 Id. at 793 (emphasis added). For the standard which the court is applying in this passage,
see supra pt. III(A). The court went on to offer the following scenario:
Suppose that at trial the government were to introduce bank records produced in
response to a subpoena that had been accompanied by the consent form and that it was not
apparent from the face of the records or otherwise how Ranauro was linked to them. Sup-
pose also that the government then introduced the subpoena and consent form, and a gov-
ernment witness testified that the bank records were received in response to the subpoena
and consent form. Would not the evidence linking Ranauro to the records be his own
testimonial admission of consent? We believe it would.
Id. at 793.
299 Id. at 794.
300 Id. (citations omitted) (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973); Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 91 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring) and McNabb v. United
States, 381 U.S. 332, 340 (1942)).
301 See Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 795.
302 Id. at 795. The directive is reproduced in the opinion. See id. at 796 (app.).
303 Id. at 795. The court also rejected Ranauro's argument that "in signing the form, [he]
would be making a willful false statement in violation of Federal law." Id. See Alexander, 811 F.2d
at 117 (for the court's position on this issue). See also supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
304 Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 795. This is perfectly consistent with the Alexander court's holding.
See, ag., Alexander, 811 F.2d at 117-18 ("While we have noted that enforcement of this directive
does not rise to a constitutional violation, it nevertheless offends basic precepts of honest behavior by
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guishes Ghidoni and Cid on the basis that "the directives involved in
those cases ... indicated that they were executed under court order."305
Having made that distinction, however, the court cautioned that
this was not the sole predicate for its holding: "[W]e disagree with the
Ghidoni court's conclusion that the consent directive contained no testi-
mony relevant to the questions of existence of accounts in the witness's
name or of control over those accounts. ' 3 6  The court then reiterated
that a consent directive is "a testimonial assertion of consent.
3 7
It also took issue with Ghidoni's assertion that "the non-testimonial
nature" of consent directives is illustrated by the fact that a witness who
is compelled to execute such a directive "can still maintain that the
records do not exist, [and] that he does not control them. '30 8 The First
Circuit found this error onerous because "once Ghidoni signed the con-
sent form, he could no longer argue that he did not consent to the release
of the accounts. 30
9
The opinion also takes issue with a dissent authored by Judge
Breyer. 310 The dissent argues that consent directives do not constitute
"testimonial assertions" because (a) the process of executing a directive is
functionally indistinguishable from the process of supplying a physical
exemplar, 31 1 and (b) one cannot "lie or commit perjury either by signing
invoking the district court's imprimatur on a document that would be misleading."). See also supra
notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
305 Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 795. For a discussion of Ghidoni and Cid, see supra pt. III(B)(1).
306 Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 795 (citing Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 818). See supra pt. III(B)(1).
307 Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 795. "Though the assertion of consent would not itself have estab-
lished the ultimate facts of existence or control, it would have been compelled testimony that could
have furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed to prove those facts." Id. at 796 (citing Hoff-
man v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); In re Kave, 760 F.2d 343 (1st Cir. 1985)).
308 Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 796 (quoting Ghidoni, 732 F.2d at 819).
309 Id. at 796. "The admission of consent would be contrary to the position that the accounts
did not exist and that he did not control them, for it could be used as a link in the chain proving both
their existence and his control over them." Id.
310 Id. at 794.
311 Id. at 797 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
Ranauro's position is similar to that of a suspect compelled to stand in a lineup, to
give a handwriting or blood sample, to speak lines, or to put on clothing.... In each of
these instances a person is compelled to provide possibly incriminating evidence, but is not
asked to make a (potentially false) assertion.
Id. (citations omitted). Judge Breyer contended that the majority erred in concluding that the direc-
tive constituted an assertion because it permitted the inference that the records which it produced
"belonged" to Ranauro: "T]he inference... would not depend upon the jury's belief in the truth of
Ranauro's 'assertion' of consent. Rather, the inference would depend upon the non-assertive fact
that Ranauro placed his signature at the bottom of a consent form." Id.
According to Judge Breyer, the circumstances surrounding Ranauro's placing his signature at
the bottom of a consent form are
no more relevant than whether a suspect believes the truth of the words he speaks for
purposes of voice identification. In fact, the inference a jury might draw here is rather like
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or by not signing the form." '312 The majority rejected both propositions,
asserting that (a) "the risk of perjury is not always... [a] "prerequisite to
invocation of the privilege," '313 and (b) a consent directive "can[not] be
likened to a physical exemplar." '314
IV. "FOREGONE CONCLUSIONS": AN ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINING
WHEN THE EXECUTION OF A "COMPELLED CONSENT" IS
ENCOMPASSED BY THE PROTECTIONS OF THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT
The cases considered in part III(B) can be reconciled 15 by means of
an analysis derived from (a) a proposition which was enunciated in
Fisher3 16 and (b) an observation which appears in South Dakota v. Nev-
ille.317 Part IV(A) examines the proposition and the observation, while
the one it might draw on hearing that a key taken from an arrested suspect opened a safe
deposit box containing contraband. The inference simply does not depend on the truth of
any assertion Ranauro has made.
Id. at 798.
312 Id. at 797. This comment followed observations (a) that "a fundamental purpose of the
privilege is to avoid 'subject[ing] those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt,'... [and (b) that] one can commit 'perjury' only with respect to an assertion."
Id. (citation omitted). The dissent contends that the majority opinion errs in finding that Ranauro
would "assert" consent by executing the form:
[He] does not 'assert' consent (nor does he 'admit' consent or 'assure' consent); rather,
he performs a verbal act: he grants consent.
*.. This linguistic' point is important because a grant of consent is not the kind of
thing that can be true or false.... [l]t is not a proper subject matter of a perjury
proceeding.
Id. at 798. Judge Breyer is careful to note that he does "not mean to say the [f]ifth [a]mendment can
apply only when indictable 'perjury' is at issue." Id. "Rather, I note simply that legal perjury and
the fifth amendment have one thing in common: both deal with assertions-the kind of communica-
tion that could, in principle, be false." Id.
313 Id. at 794 (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)). The major-
ity quotes a passage from Murphy in which the Supreme Court identifies six "fundamental values"
which the privilege reflects in addition to the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or con-
tempt". Id. at 794 n.3 (quoting 378 U.S. at 55). The majority opinion also asserts that the validity
of its position "is illustrated by perhaps the most blatant imaginable example of a fifth amendment
violation, where a court orders a suspect to either swear to a prepared confession or suffer the penal-
ties of contempt." Id. at 794.
314 Id. at 794.
Since the content of a physical characteristic... pre-exists any court order, the only
thing compelled by the government... is the act of producing the pre-existing physical
characteristic in the form of a sample. Since the creation of the characteristic is not com-
pelled, its content, even if testimonial and no matter how incriminating, falls outside the
scope of the privilege. In contra9t, in this case the government is compelling the creation of
the content, not the production, of the evidence "I consent."
Id.
315 This reconciliation is possible with, however, certain exceptions. See supra pt. III(B).
316 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
317 103 U.S. 916 (1983).
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part IV(B) articulates the analysis.
A. A Proposition and an Observation
1. Fisher v. United States
Part III(A) of this Article discussed the U.S. Supreme Court's opin-
ion in Fisher; that discussion did not, however, consider a subordinate
proposition which was enunciated as an aspect of the holding in that
case. In other words the surrender of Fisher's documents did not consti-
tute a testimonial assertion because "[t]he existence and location of the
papers [was] a foregone conclusion," so that Fisher "add[ed] little or
nothing to the sum total of the [G]overnment's information by conceding
that he in fact ha[d] the papers."'3 18
This proposition was appended to the Court's holding that "[t]he
act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena.., has communica-
tive aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers pro-
duced." '3 19 The "communicative aspects" of such an act lie in the
possibility that "[c]ompliance ... [will] tacitly concede[ ] the existence of
the papers demanded... their possession or control by the taxpayer ....
[and] the taxpayer's belief that the papers are those described in the sub-
poena."320 Whether such a tacit concession actually exists "depend[s] on
the facts and circumstances of particular cases or classes thereof."32
The Court applied this proposition in Doe :322 Unlike Fisher, "John
Doe" "did not concede... that the records listed in the subpoena actu-
ally existed or were in his possession." '323 Instead, he "argued that by
producing the records he would tacitly admit their existence and his pos-
session. '  Doe also argued that
if the Government obtained the documents from another source, it
would have to authenticate them before they would be admissible at
318 425 U.S. at 411 ("Fisher" is a collective reference to Solomon Fisher, Cyril D. Kasmir, and
Jerry Candy, attorneys of the taxpayers whose cases were jointly decided by the Fisher opinion.). See
id. at 393-96. See supra pt. III(A) (for a discussion of the facts at issue in Fisher).
319 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. See also supra pt. III(A).
320 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (citing Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)). See also
supra pt. III(A).
321 Fisher 425 U.S. at 410 ("These questions ...do not lend themselves to categorical
answers.").
322 465 U.S. 605 (1984). See supra pt. III(A) (for a discussion of the holding in Doe).
323 Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13. In Fisher, the taxpayers "stipulated... that the documents
involved... exist[ed] and [were] those described in the subpoenas .. " Fisher, 425 U.S. at 430 n.9
(Brennan, J., concurring).
324 Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13. Doe presented his arguments in a motion to quash which was
filed with the District Court for the District Court of New Jersey; that court "found that the act of
production would compel [Doe] to admit that the records exist, that they are in his possession, and
that they are authentic.'" Id. at 608 (quoting In re Grand Jury Empanelled Mar. 19, 1980, 541 F.
Supp. 1, 3 (1981)).
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trial .... By producing the documents, [he] would relieve the
[g]overnment of the need for authentication.32 5
After holding that "[t]hese allegations were sufficient to establish a valid
claim of the privilege against self-incrimination," '32 6 the Court included
the following qualification: "This is not to say that the [g]overnment was
foreclosed from rebutting [Doe's] claim by producing evidence that pos-
session, existence, and authentication were a 'foregone conclusion.' "327
The "foregone conclusion" test clearly cannot be used in determin-
ing whether a particular act is encompassed by the protections of the fifth
amendment. Less clear is whether the test derives from the testimonial or
incriminating aspects of the act of production. The majority opinion in
Fisher is apparently predicated upon the testimonial significance of such
an act, while Justice Brennan issued a concurring opinion which was
predicated upon the incriminating potential of an act of production.32 8
Although resolution of this issue is of particular significance to the "com-
pelled consents" analysis, it is also a matter which is most appropriately
addressed after the discussion of South Dakota v. Neville. The resolution
of this issue, therefore, appears in part IV(B).
Aside from this uncertainty, the test is firmly grounded in tradi-
tional fifth amendment precepts: Professor Wigmore presents an exhaus-
tive discussion of "the dozen policies which have been advanced" as
justifying the privilege against self-incrimination which is embodied in
325 Doe, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13. (citation omitted).
326 Id.
327 Id. (citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411).
328 1 disagree'... that implicit admission of the existence and possession or control of the
papers... is not "testimonial" merely because the government could readily have other-
wise proved existence and possession or ontrol .... I know of no [f]ifth [a]mendment
principle which makes the testimonial nature of evidence ... turn on the strength of the
Government's case....
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 428-29 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan concluded, however, that notwithstanding the testimonial significance of
[the Fisher] taxpayers' production of their records, the implicit testimony they would fur-
nish... would not tend to incriminate them because they had already stipulated that the
records existed and that those records matched the descriptions contained in the subpoe-
nas....
The difference between Justice Brennan's view and that of the majority seems largely
semantic. Whether the strength of the Government's evidence determines the protection to be
accorded the act ofproducing... documents because it diminishes the act's testimonial value
or because it lessens its self-incriminating character is of little moment, so long as the sub-
stantive threshold for protection remains the same.
In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1276 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis added and citation omitted)
(noting that "[the substantive equivalence of the two views is further evidenced by the fact that
Justice Brennan did not take issue with the majority's reiteration of Fisher's 'foregone conclusion'
test in Texas Doe.") (citing 465 U.S. at 614 n.3.).
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that amendment. 329 After considering and rejecting nine such policies,
Wigmore arrives at what he describes as a "concern... with the 'fishing
expedition,' with what under Elizabeth and James amounted to the un-
lawful process of poking about in the speculation of finding something
chargeable. 330
Although he discusses this policy in a slightly different context,331
Wigmore's observations are perfectly applicable to the (perhaps implicit)
considerations which prompted the articulation of the "foregone conclu-
sion" test. What he calls "[t]he 'pure poking about' fishing expedition" is
one of the evils which that test is intended to eliminate. The goal is to
ensure that the government not utilize the subpoena power to "poke
about" in an individual's files in order to locate evidence the nature and
existence of which was previously unknown to law enforcement offi-
cials.3 32 As part IV(B) illustrates the result of such an enterprise is co-
erced self-incrimination in violation of the clear dictates of the fifth
amendment.333
329 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2251 at 297 (McNaughton ed.
1961) (footnote omitted).
330 Id. at 314. The condemnation of such expenditures is, of course, a traditional feature of
fifth amendment analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1983), quoted in
Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. 746, 748 (S.D. Tex 1984) and United States v. Pedro, 662 F. Supp. 47, 49
(W.D. Ky. 1987). See supra pt. III(B)(2).
331 Wigmore suggests that the concern with discouraging "fishing expeditions" reflects a desire
to "protect[ ] the individual from being prosecuted for crimes of insufficient notoriety or seriousness
to be of a real concern to society." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 329, § 2251, at 314. Each of us, after
all, is a criminal more or less. But as to most of our crimes we are, practically speaking, the indis-
pensable threshold witnesses. It could go without saying that the law does not intend that all these
crimes be prosecuted. Id. at 314-15 (footnote omitted).
332 A recent Eighth Circuit decision explicates this aspect of the Fisher holding:
The Fisher Court... suggest[ed] that if the existence, possession, and authenticity of
the documents are a "foregone conclusion" and the taxpayer "adds little or nothing to the
sum total of the Government's information" by his act of producing the documents, the
taxpayer's [flifth [a]mendment privilege is not violated "because nothing he has said or
done is deemed to be sufficiently testimonial for purposes of the privilege."... In such a
case the tacit averments of the taxpayer in producing the documents would not rise to the
level of testimony within the protection of the [flifth [a]mendment, since any information
implicitly conceded in producing the documents is already within the Government's
knowledge. "Under these circumstances by enforcement of the summons no constitutional
rights are touched. The question is not of testimony but of surrender.'"
United States v. Rue, 819 F.2d 1488, 1492 (8th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) (quoting Fisher, 425
U.S. at 411 (quoting In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911))). Rue held that "the burdens of produc-
tion and proof on the questions of the existence, possession, and authenticity of... summoned
documents are on the Government, not the taxpayer." 819 F.2d at 1493 n.4 (citing Doe, 465 U.S. at
614 n.13).
333 For the proposition that the privilege only permits inquiries which add to the government's
existing knowledge as to the commission of criminal acts, see United States v. Schlansky, 709 F.2d
1079, 1084 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984) ("[d]oes it confirm that which was
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(2) South Dakota v. Neville
While it is clear that the privilege protects against "the cruel, [lit-
era)] expedient of compelling [incriminating testimony] from [the indi-
vidual's] own mouth," '334 the extent to which this protection extends to
more esoteric forms of communication has been a matter of some debate.
Wigmore contended that the privilege is "limited to words spoken by the
subject." '335 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected Wigmore's
contention, it has also found that various non-verbal acts do not consti-
tute "testimonial communications" within the compass of the
privilege.3 36
It appears that the Court has at least implicitly adopted Wigmore's
analysis of the testimonial possibilities of non-verbal physical acts.337
Wigmore distinguished between physical acts as communication and as
real evidence.338
previously unknown to the government[?]"); United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1983)
(does it add to the "sum total of the Government's information... [?]").
"Mhe constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government...
must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a fair state-individual
balance,' to require the government to shoulder the entire load' ... our accusatory system
of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce
the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple
expedient of compelling it from his own mouth."
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (1966)) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)). The Ranauro court quoted this passage as supporting the proposition that
[elven if the consent form ... were not, by itself, to be considered direct testimony by
Ranauro of his control over whatever bank accounts are produced as a result of his execu-
tion of the form, it so closely approximates such testimony that we believe its compelled
creation and subsequently incriminating use would violate not only the values underlying
the fifth amendment but also the essence of our accusatorial system of justice[.]
Ranauro, 814 F.2d at 794. See also supra pt. III(B)(2).
334 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 762 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
335 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 124, at 302 (3d ed. 1984) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note
329; § 2263 at 378-79). According to Wigmore, the privilege "was directed at the employment of
legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission of guilt which would thus take the
place of other evidence. That is, it was intended to prevent the use of legal compulsion to extract
from the person a sworn communication of his knowledge of facts which would incriminate him." 8
. WIGMORE, supra note 329, § 2263, at 378-79.
336 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763 n.7 (1966). For a discussion of the acts which
have been held not to constitute such communications, see id. (blood tests); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967) (lineups); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1973) (voice exem-
plar); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266 (1967) (handwriting exemplar). See also Dann, The
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence from a Suspect,
43 So. CAL. L. REV. 597 (1970).
337 Although the Court first applied this analysis in a case which antedated the appearance of
Wigmore's treatise, subsequent decisions appear to have followed Wigmore's conceptualization of
that analysis. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
763-64 (1966). See also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 774-75 (Black, J., dissenting).
338 If, for example, it is desired to ascertain whether the accused has lost his right hand
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According to Wigmore, physical acts, statements or both do not
constitute "testimonial evidence" whenever their evidentiary significance
does not depend upon a process of inference, but is equivalent to that
associated with any artifact which is introduced as a form of direct evi-
dence. 339  The Court first applied this distinction in Holt v. United
States :340
and wears an iron hook in place of it, one source of belief on the subject would be the
testimony of a witness who had seen the arm; in believing this testimonial evidence, there is
an inference from the human assertion to the fact asserted. A second source of belief
would be the mark left on some substance grasped or carried by the accused; in believing
this circumstantial evidence, there is an inference from the circumstance to the thing pro-
ducing it. A third source of belief remains, namely, the inspection by the tribunal of the
accused's arm. This source differs from the other two in omitting any step of conscious
inference or reasoning, and in proceeding by direct self-perception....
4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1150 at 322 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
Wigmore prefers the phrase "autopticproference" to the term "real evidence" for the reason that the
evidentiary significance of a particular artifact results from "the tribunal's self-perception, or au-
topsy, of the thing itself." Id.
Autoptic proference calls for no inference from the thing perceived to some other
thing; and in this sense... autoptic proference is "not evidence," i.e., not evidence in so far
as evidence implies a process of inference.... It is something more than and different from
testimonial or circumstantial evidence, and it is to be included among the kinds of evidence
in the broader sense of that term.
Id. at 324.
339 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 329, § 2265 at 386 (citations omitted).
[A]n inspection of the bodily features by the tribunal... does not violate the privilege
[against self-incrimination] because it does not call upon the accused as a witness-i.e.,
upon his testimonial responsibility. That he may in such cases be required sometimes to
exercise muscular action-as when he is required to take off his shoes or roll up his
sleeve-is immaterial, unless all bodily actions were synonymous with testimonial utter-
ance.... What is obtained from the accused by such action is not testimony about his
body, but his body itself.... Unless some attempt is made to secure a communication-
written, oral or otherwise-upon which reliance is to be placed as involving his conscious-
ness of the facts and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the demand made upon
him is not a testimonial one.
Id. at 386. "E.g. viewing, measuring, placing a hat on and even moving a limb of the relaxed body of
the individual do not offend the policies of the privilege ... and are not the sort of things which
historically gave rise to the privilege .... " Id. at 378, § 2263 (references and footnote omitted).
[B]oth federal and state courts have usually held that [the privilege against self-incrim-
ination] offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photograph-
ing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to
assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The distinction ... is that the
privilege is a bar against compelling "communications" or "testimony," but that compulsion
which makes a suspect or accused the source of "real or physical evidence" does not violate it.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
340 218 U.S. 245 (1910). The Holt decision, of course, antedates the issuance of the treatise in
which Wigmore developed the above-noted distinction between physical acts and states as communi-
cation and as real evidence. See, e.g., 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2265 (1st ed. 1905). Although Holt applies the distinction, the application is not accompanied by
an articulated rationale but is, instead, justified on the following basis: "[T]he prohibition of compel-
ling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
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There the question was whether evidence was admissible that the ac-
cused, prior to trial and over his protest, put on a blouse that fitted
him. It was contended that compelling the accused to submit to the
demand that he model the blouse violated the privilege. Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Court, rejected the argument... : "[T]he
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness
against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compul-
sion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body
as evidence when it may be material. The objection in principle would
forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a
photograph in proof.
' 34 1
The Holt analysis has been extended to encompass artifacts generated by
physical acts, as well as the physical acts.342
This rationale has led the Court to conclude that, for example,
handwriting exemplars do not constitute "testimonial communications"
within the meaning of the privilege.343  The essential distinction is be-
tween "artifact" and "communication." If the evidentiary importance of
a particular physical act, or the product of a particular physical act, is as
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence
when it may be material." Holt, 218 U.S. at 252-53. The only authority Holt cites as support for
this proposition is Adam v. New York which held that the privilege against self-incrimination was not
violated by the admission of the accused's "private papers" given that "[h]e did not take the witness
stand in his own behalf" and "was not compelled to testify concerning the papers or make any
admission about them." Adam v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 597-98 (1904) (citing Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)). It appears, therefore, that Holt antedated Wigmore's development of
his analysis as to why corporeal evidence does not constitute a testimonial communication which is
encompassed by the privilege; it also appears that the Supreme Court subsequently adopted Wig-
mores formulation of this issue as the rationale for decisions which followed this aspect of Holt. See
generally Annotation, Physical Examination or Exhibition of or Tests Upon, Suspect or Accused, As
Violating Rights Guaranteed By Federal Constitution-Federal Cases, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1332 (1967);
Annotation, Physical Examination or Exhibition of or Tests Upon, Suspect or Accused, As Violating
Rights Guaranteed By Federal Constitution-Federal Cases, 22 L. Ed. 2d 909 (1970); Annotation,
Requiring Submission to Physical Examination or Test As Violation of Constitutional Rights, 25
A.L.RL2d 1407 (1952).
341 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763 (quoting Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910)
(footnote omitted). Although the omitted footnote contains the Schmerber Court's rejection of Wig-
mores categorical limitation of the privilege to verbal communications, it appears that the Court
followed Wigmore in holding that the privilege does not apply whenever physical acts or states are
admissible as "real or physical evidence." See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 763 n.7.
342 See, eg., 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 329, § 2265 (fingerprints, photographs, voice exem-
plars, handwriting samples).
343 "A mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what is written, like the voice
or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside" the protection of the privilege. Gil-
bert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1967) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23
(1967) (voice exemplars)). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 329, § 2263 at 397; Hartzell v. United
States, 72 F.2d 569, 585 (8th Cir. 1934) (accused's signature on bail bond used as sample of hand-
writing for comparison purposes did not constitute "testimony" within the compass of the privilege).
1988]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV
an artifact, a species of "real or physical evidence," then the privilege
does not apply.
Recently, however, the Court has recognized that the distinction
cannot always be applied categorically. The Court in South Dakota v.
Neville 31 considered the testimonial significance of a driver's refusal to
submit to a blood alcohol test.345 A state statute provided that such a
refusal was "admissible into evidence at a trial for driving under the in-
fluence of alcohol. '3 46 Neville was stopped by two police officers, who
asked that he submit to such a test; Neville refused, announcing "I'm too
drunk, I won't pass. '347
Neville eventually sought to suppress the evidence of his refusal to
take the test; the local court granted his motion, and the South Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute "violated the federal
and state privilege against self-incrimination." 348  The South Dakota
court concluded that "the refusal was a communicative act involving
[Neville's] testimonial capacities and that the State compelled this com-
munication by forcing [him] "to choose between submitting to a perhaps
unpleasant examination and producing testimonial evidence against
himself. ' 3 4 9
On appeal the U.S. Supreme Court found "considerable force" in
the argument that the refusal was not testimonial, but "similar to other
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt, such as escape from
custody and suppression of evidence. '3 0  Still, it declined to hold that
such a refusal can never constitute a testimonial communication within
344 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
345 Id. at 554. "We now address a question left open in [footnote nine of Schmerber], and hold
that the admission into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to such a test ... does not offend
the right against self-incrimination." Id.
346 Id. at 554 n.4 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-13-28.1 (Supp. 1982)). Under the
statute, one could "not claim privilege against self-incrimination with regard to admission of refusal
to submit to chemical analysis." Id. See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10.1 (Supp. 1982)
("refusal to submit to blood alcohol test may be admissible into evidence at the trial' ") (quoting
Neville, 459 U.S. at 556).
347 Neville, 459 U.S. at 555. After he was taken to the police station, Neville "informed the
officers that he had been drinking 'close to one case' by himself at home, and that his last drink was
'about ten minutes ago.'" Id. at 556 n.3.
348 Id. at 556 (citing State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981)).
349 Id. at 557-58 (quoting Neville 312 N.W.2d at 726 and State v. Andrews, 297 Minn. 260,
262, 212 N.W.2d 863, 864 (1973), cert denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974)).
350 Id. at 561. The state drew an analogy between refusing to take a blood test and acts such as
flight and the suppression of evidence. See id. at 561. The Court's position on this issue is consistent
with that which appears in the plurality opinion in California v. Byers. The opinion upheld the
constitutionality of a statute which required that motor vehicle operators who were involved in
accidents stop and furnish their name and address to the other individuals who were involved.
Although Chief Justice Burger contended that the act of stopping was "no more testimonial" than
the acts of appearing in a line-up or of giving a handwriting exemplar, the majority disagreed, hold-
ing that the act was, indeed, "testimonial" within the meaning of the fifth amendment. Id. at 431.
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the compass of the privilege.3 51 Because it declined to hold that such a
refusal can never constitute a testimonial communication, 352 the Court
predicated its holding upon an alternative theory: there was no infringe-
ment of the privilege because Neville was not subjected to "impermissible
compulsion."
353
The significance of Neville lay in its explicit recognition of the com-
municative ambiguity which is associated with certain categories of phys-
ical acts. Although the recognition of this circumstance was implicit in
some of the Court's earlier decisions, Neville was the first to predicate its
holding upon the testimonial ambiguities inherent in a given act.354
351 Neville, 459 U.S. at 561-62 (citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764).
[Tihe distinction between real or physical evidence, on the one hand, and communica-
tions or testimony, on the other, is not readily drawn in many cases.... The situations
arising from a refusal present a difficult gradation from a person who indicates refusal by
complete inaction, to one who nods his head negatively, to one who states "I refuse to take
the test," to the respondent here, who stated, "I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test."
Id. The citation to Schmerber is a reference to the holding that "the privilege is a bar against com-
pelling 'communications' or 'testimony,' but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the
source of 'real or physical evidence' does not violate it." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
352 Neville, of course, differs from the facts which were at issue in Schmerber where the
Supreme Court held that the results of a blood test do not constitute testimonial communication
within the meaning of the fifth amendment. The Schmerber holding was based upon the distinction
presented above, i.e., that the results of the test constituted an artifact, a species of "real or physical
evidence." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. The Court found that Schmerber's "testimonial capacities
were in no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results
of the test, which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone." Id. at 765 (footnote omitted).
Schmerber also argued that the state violated his fifth amendment privilege by introducing evidence
that he refused to submit to a "breathalyzer" test; the court held, however, that the argument was
"foreclosed by [Schmerber's] failure to object on this ground" at trial. Id. at 765-66 n.9.
353 See Neville, 459 U.S. at 562. "Since no impermissible coercion is involved when the suspect
refuses to submit to take the test, regardless of the form of refusal, we prefer to rest our decision on
this ground...." Id.
354 One area in which this issue had arisen, prior to Neville, was the use of polygraphs, or "lie
detectors." After discussing this distinction between physical acts as "tesimony" and as "real or
physical evidence", the Schmerber Court offered the following observations on this issue:
Although we agree that this distinction is a helpful framework for analysis, we are not
to be understood to agree with past applications in all instances. There will be many cases
in which such a distinction is not readily drawn. Some tests seemingly directed to obtain
"physical evidence," for example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function
during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially
testimonial. To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to
determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or
not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the [f]ifth [a]mendment.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. The Court also found, however, that "no such problem of application
[was] presented" on the facts before it because "[n]ot even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon
or enforced communication by the accused was involved.., in the extraction" of blood. See id. at
765. See also 8 J. WiGMORE, supra note 329, § 2265. See generally Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(198 1) (statements to psychiatrist during court-ordered examination encompassed by the privilege).
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B. "Foregone Conclusions" and "Fishing Expeditions": An Analysis of
the Fifth Amendment Consequences of "Compelled Consents"
Neville recognized that particular physical acts can constitute either
"testimony" within the compass of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination or "real or physical evidence" to which the privilege
does not apply. Implicit in this recognition was the rejection of a propo-
sition which appears to animate certain of the Court's decisions and
which Wigmore explicitly adopts: the protections of the fifth amendment
apply only to oral communications.355
Although it is questionable whether the Court ever adopted this
proposition,356 many of its decisions appear to rely upon a categorical
distinction between "testimony" and physical states or conduct.35 7 Nev-
ille, however, definitely established that the testimonial significance of
particular, non-verbal conduct is not a matter which can be determined
categorically. Instead, the testimonial significance of such conduct can
be determined only by considering the "facts and circumstances of par-
ticular cases." '358
It is this principle that provides the key to understanding the cases
which were discussed in part III(B). Although they do not explicitly
address this issue, case holdings result from either (a) the implicit appli-
cation of this principle,359 or (b) the implicit rejection of this principle in
favor of the principle which was explicitly rejected in Neville, i.e., that
physical conduct can never constitute "testimonial communication"
within the meaning of the fifth amendment.3 °
The cases which implicitly rejected the principle held that the execu-
tion of a "compelled consent" is not an act which is encompassed by the
privilege against self-incrimination.361 These holdings err because
(a) they ignore the Neville principle, and (b) they ignore the observation
355 Wigmore apparently derives his position on this issue from the proposition that the privi-
lege was articulated in order to "prevent[ ] torture and other inhumane treatment of a human be-
ing." 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 329, § 2251 at 315. See id. § 2251 at 315-16.
356 See supra pt. IV(A).
357 See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
358 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976) (describing the inquiry which must be
conducted in order to determine whether a particular act of production is "testimonial' and incrimi-
nating' for purposes of. . .the [flifth [a]mendment"). Id. Interestingly enough, Fisher cites no
authority as support for this proposition. See id.
Although the Fisher Court was speaking only of the testimonial implications of the act of pro-
ducing documents, this observation is perfectly consistent with Neville's holding that "the distinction
between real or physical evidence ... and communications or testimony" can be a function of the
peculiar circumstances which are involved in a particular instance. See, e.g., Neville, 459 U.S. at
561.
359 See supra pt. III(B)(2).
360 See supra pt. III(B)(1).
361 Id.
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in Fisher that whether "[t]he act of producing evidence in response to a
subpoena" has "testimonial" and "incriminating" aspects depends upon
the "facts and circumstances of particular cases." '3 62
The cases which held that the execution of a "compelled consent" is
an act which is encompassed by the fifth amendment applied an essen-
tially unarticulated version of the analysis which must be utilized in this
context. The analysis is derived from three propositions: (1) the Neville
proposition that the communicative aspects of physical conduct are a
function of the particular conduct which is at issue and of the context in
which it occurs; (2) the Fisher proposition that the "testimonial" and
"incriminating" nature of production must be determined from the
"facts and circumstances of [a] particular" case; and (3) the subordinate
Fisher proposition that an act of production cannot be "testimonial"
within the meaning of the fifth amendment if it "adds little or nothing to
the sum total of the Government's information. 36 3
The application of this analysis results in the following calculus.
The execution of a "compelled consent" may be a "testimonial" act;
whether the execution of aparticular "compelled consent" is a "testimo-
nial" act within the meaning of the fifth amendment depends, initially,
upon whether the "existence and location" of the documents for which
production is sought is "a foregone conclusion."
If the existence and location of the documents is a "foregone conclu-
sion," then the execution of the consent cannot be a "testimonial commu-
nication," because it adds "little or nothing to the sum total of the
Government's information.' ' 31 The consent does not constitute "testi-
mony" because the government learns nothing from the physical act of
executing the document; instead, the execution of the document is a
physical act which "merely... 'remove[s] an obstacle' to the production
of foreign bank records. 365
In this instance, the physical act of signing the form is analytically
indistinguishable from the physical act of providing a handwriting exem-
plar. The government "discovers" nothing from the act. Unlike the
physical act which was at issue in Neville, the execution of the exemplar
cannot be used as the basis for an inference which supports a finding of
guilt.36 6 Perhaps the better analogy is to the act of supplying blood for a
362 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410.
363 Id. at 411. If, in other words, "[t]he existence and location of the papers are a foregone
conclusion." Id. at 411. See supra pt. IV(A).
364 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
365 United States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp. 245, 249 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting United States v.
Quigg, Crim. No. 80-41-1, slip op. at 5, (D. Vt. Jan. 5, 1981)).
366 This is true, of course, so long as the consent, or a court order attendant upon the execution
of the consent, provides that it cannot be used as an admission. See, eg., United States v. Grand
Jury Witness, 811 F.2d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1987). See also supra pt. III(B)(1).
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blood alcohol test. In both instances, the accused is compelled to per-
form a physical act which has no intrinsic testimonial significance but
which results in the production of physical evidence that can be used
against him.
With respect to the act of supplying blood, the government "discov-
ers" no new information from the act. Rather, it obtains a physical arti-
fact which may provide "real or physical evidence" to support a finding
of guilt.367 With respect to the execution of a consent directive, as long
as the "existence and location" of the documents is a "foregone conclu-
sion," the same result ensues. That is, if the government is aware of the
"existence and location" of the documents, then the physical act of exe-
cuting such a directive communicates no new information but simply
yields a physical artifact which may provide "real or physical evidence"
to support a finding of guilt.
If, however, the government is not aware of the "existence and loca-
tion" of the documents, then the physical act of executing such a form
does communicate new information. The "testimonial communication"
is hence encompassed by the privilege.368 The execution of the consent
permits the government to "discover" evidence of which it was ignorant,
thereby permitting "precisely [the] sort of fishing expedition that the fifth
amendment was designed to prevent. 369
The implicit recognition of this principle animates the holdings in
the decisions considered in part II(B)(2). Those decisions held that the
367 Not even a shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the
accused was involved either in the extraction [of blood] or in the chemical analysis. Peti-
tioner's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except
as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on chemical analysis and
on that alone.
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 (footnote omitted).
368 The [Senate] Committee is asking the Court to order Secord to place his signature at
the bottom of a prepared consent directive. By characterizing the directive as a tool to
obtain unprotected bank records, the Committee likens the signing of it to the preparation
of a handwriting exemplar, which is clearly non-testimonial. The difference, however, is
that the directive's content is what the Committee needs, not a sample of Secord's
handwriting.
Senate Select Comm. v. Secord, 664 F. Supp. 562, 565 (D.D.C. 1987) (emphasis in original and
citation omitted). See also United States v. Pedro, 662 F. Supp. 47, 49 (W.D. Ky. 1987) ("The
government needs Respondent's signature for what it could disclose and Respondent would, thus, be
testifying within the meaning of the fifth amendment.").
369 United States v. Fox, 721 F.2d 32, 38 (2d Cir. 1983). Fox provides the perfect illustration
of this proposition, although in a slightly different context. After the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") issued an administrative summons requiring that he "appear, testify and produce ... docu-
ments," Dr. Martin Fox refused to comply, "invoking his [ffifth [a]mendment privilege against self-
incrimination." Id. at 34. The IRS petitioned for enforcement of the summons, and the district
court granted that petition. Id. at 34-35.
Fox appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that "enforcement ... would require him to per-
form ... incriminating testimonial acts ... [in that] he would be forced (I) to acknowledge the
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execution of a consent directive is a "testimonial communication" which
is encompassed by the protections of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The implicit recognition and application of
this principle is evident both from these holdings and the factors upon
which these courts relied in arriving at their holdings. Several of these
decisions found it significant, for example, that the individual who was
refusing to execute such a consent had not been indicted.3 7
Why is the lack of an indictment significant for purposes of a fifth
amendment analysis of the "testimonial" consequences of a particular
act? In Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Fisher, he observed that
the testimonial significance of a particular act should not "turn on the
strength of the [g]overnment's case" against an individual."'
These decisions apparently used the lack of an indictment as an im-
plicit indicator of the "strength of the Government's case," from which
one can infer that these courts were applying the following analysis to
determine whether the execution of a consent directive was "testimonial"
within the compass of the fifth amendment. If an indictment had been
returned, then this indicated that the government was aware of the
"existence and location" of the accounts which were at issue in the con-
sent directive; if the government did possess such information, then the
execution of the directive was permissible under the "foregone conclu-
sion" standard in Fisher.
If, however, an indictment had not been returned, then this meant
that the government was not aware of the "existence and location" of the
accounts which were at issue in the consent directive; if the government
was not already aware of this information, then the execution of the di-
rective would provide the government with new information and would,
therefore, constitute a "testimonial communication" within the meaning
existence of records of which the government was unaware, and (2) to implicitly authenticate the
records of his own." Id. at 37 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit agreed. Id.
With respect to the first proposition, the court found that the acknowledgment derived from the
non-specific language used in the summons:
[Tihe IRS summons for all books and records... and all bank and brokerage records
of a taxpayer may compel the taxpayer to add to the "sum total of the Government's
information." The inference we draw from this broad-sweeping summons is that the gov-
ernment is attempting to compensate for its lack of knowledge by requiring Dr. Fox to
become the primary informant against himself. It is precisely this sort of fishing expedition
that the [flifth [a]mendment was designed to prevent. Accordingly, we hold that the en-
forcement of this summons would result in compelled testimonial communication.
Id. at 38 (emphasis in original and citations omitted.).
370 See, eg., Pedro, 662 F. Supp at 49; Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. 746, 748 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
Although the court did not emphasize this factor, the Ranauro decision also involved an individual
who had not yet become the subject of an indictment. See Ranauro, 814 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1987).
Accord, Senate Select Comm. v. Secord, 664 F. Supp 562 (D.D.C. 1987).
371 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 429 (Brennan, J., concurring). See supra pt. IV(A)(1).
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of the fifth amendment.372 It seems that the decisions which were con-
sidered in part III(B)(2), utilized the existence or non-existence of an
indictment as a prima facie indicator for the application of the "foregone
conclusion" standard.373 Under this admittedly unexplicated calculus, 3 74
the inquiry utilizes the returning of an indictment as the "benchmark"
for determining whether the government is endeavoring to embark upon
a "fishing expedition" in violation of the fifth amendment protections.375
While this approach may possess a certain intuitive appeal, it is not
consistent with the Fisher requirement that the "facts and circum-
stances" of a particular case must be considered in determining whether
or not a given act constitutes a "testimonial communication" within the
meaning of that amendment. Although no constitutional violation is
likely to ensue from the application of this approach where no indictment
has been returned, the converse is not true-that is, while it is almost
certain that no constitutional error will result from a refusal to require
372 In the present case, the consent directives are not limited to named banks and the
government has effectively admitted that it does not know whether respondent, in fact, had
a foreign bank account.... Thus .... compulsion of the proposed consent directives would
supply a necessary link in the evidentiary chain by confirming the existence or location of
materials previously unknown to the government.
Pedro, 662 F. Supp. at 49 (emphasis added). This passage illustrates that the Pedro court, for one,
was applying the Fisher "foregone conclusion" standard, although without identifying it as such. See
id. at 48-49. This opinion also includes an observation which supports the inference that the lack of
an indictment has been used as an indicator of "the strength of the Government's case" for purposes
of the application of the "foregone conclusion" standard. "[T1he Respondent has not been indicted
as the government apparently does not have enough evidence to obtain an indictment and compelling
Respondent to execute the proposed consent forms could provide the government with the incrimi-
nating link necessary to obtain an indictment." Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
373 See Pedro, 662 F. Supp. at 49. See also Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. at 748 ("[w]hile the
government appears to have some evidence which has been tendered for this Court's review, the
government... does not have enough evidence to obtain an indictment").
374 Curiously, none of the decisions which were considered in supra pt. III(B)(2) explicitly
predicated their holdings upon the Fisher "foregone conclusion" standard despite the fact that this
analysis implicitly animates each decision. See, e.g., Secord, 664 F. Supp. at 564-65; Texas Doe, 599
F. Supp at 747-48; Pedro, 662 F. Supp. at 48-49; Ranauro, 814 F.2d 791, 792-93 (lst Cir. 1987).
375 Although not expressed in these terms, it may very well be that the cases which were con-
sidered supra pt. III(B)(1) applied the converse analysis, i.e., that the presence of an indictment is
primafacie evidence that the "foregone conlusion" standard has been satisfied, so that the execution
of a consent directive does not constitute a testimonial communication. See, eg., United States v.
Ghidoni, 732 F.2d 814, 816 (11th Cir. 1984) (indictment returned); Cid 767 F.2d 1131, 1133 (5th
Cir. 1985) ("existence of two prior indictments, one in the same district ... and the other in the
Southern District of Florida"); United States v. Thier, 767 F.2d 1133, 1134 (5th Cir. 1985) (records
had already been produced after Louisiana and Florida state courts, and the Eleventh Circuit re-
jected Thier's arguments as to illegal electronic surveillance); United States v. Browne, 624 F. Supp.
245, 247 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (indictment returned); United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1032-33 (2d
Cir. 1985) (indictment returned; consent executed "weeks prior to trial" which resulted in convic-
tion). Cf Contemnors, 826 F.2d 1166, 1167 (2d Cir. 1987) (indictment affirmed); Alexander, 811
F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1987) (no indictment).
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the execution of a consent, such error may result if the only requirement
for execution is the returning of an indictment.
If the only requirement for execution is an indictment, then this in-
vites the government to secure a de minimis indictment which can be
used to obtain the execution of a consent directive; this consent directive,
in turn, can be used to ascertain whether any additional evidence exists
about which the government is ignorant but which can provide the basis
for additional charges.376 Once such a directive has been executed, the
government can then use it to obtain the evidence in question; the evi-
dence can provide the basis for the return of, and a conviction on, a
superseding indictment which contains these additional charges.
This scenario illustrates the "testimonial" consequences of a direc-
tive which is executed whenever the "existence and location" of particu-
lar documents is not a "foregone conclusion." The execution of such a
directive is a testimonial act insofar as it permits the government to "dis-
cover" additional evidence as to the existence of which it was ignorant;
the execution of such a directive is, therefore, an act which is in direct
contravention of the principle that the government is required to obtain
evidence against individuals "through its own efforts" rather than
through their compelled disclosures.377
To understand the inevitable validity of this conclusion, it is neces-
sary to only apply a "but for" standard to this process: "but for" the
execution of a consent directive in the last scenario described above, the
government may never have discovered the "existence and location" of
the documentary evidence at issue.378
The "but for" standard is, of course, not implicated in the first sce-
nario described above. Because the "existence and location" of the docu-
ments is a "foregone conclusion" in this scenario, the execution of the
consent has no "but for" consequences; because the execution of the con-
sent has no "but for" consequences for the government's discovery of
incriminating information, it does not constitute a testimonial act; be-
cause the government has already discovered the "existence and loca-
tion" of the documents, the execution of the directive merely removes an
obstacle to their physical production.
In this context, the execution of the consent is functionally indistin-
guishable from the physical act of allowing blood to be drawn for a blood
alcohol test: "Under these circumstances... 'no constitutional rights are
376 This, of course, is "precisely [the] sort of fishing expedition that the [flifth [a]mendment
was designed to prevent." Fox, 721 F.2d at 38.
377 See supra pt. IV(A)(1).
378 The statement above is phrased in terms of the fact that the government "may" not have
discovered the evidence both to encompass factual idiosyncrasies and in recognition of the individual
peculiarities of the foreign banking laws which were described supra pt. I.
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touched. The question is not of testimony but of surrender.' "
It is now possible to resolve an issue which was apparently gener-
ated by Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Fisher.38° That concur-
rence asked whether, under the Fisher "foregone conclusion" standard,
"the strength of the [g]overnment's evidence" is significant "because it
diminishes the [act of production's] testimonial value or because it les-
sens its self-incriminating character.",381
The resolution of this issue must, by now, be apparent: 3 2 The
strength of the government's evidence is significant because, under the
"foregone conclusion" standard, it determines whether any act of pro-
duction, including the execution of a consent directive, has testimonial
significance.
To understand why this resolution is correct, one has only to con-
sider the following alternatives. If an individual is required to execute a
consent directive authorizing the production of documents, and the
"existence and location" of those documents is a "foregone conclusion,"
then the execution of that directive does not add "to the sum total of the
Government's information." Therefore, there is no testimonial communi-
cation within the meaning of the fifth amendment.383
This does not, however, alter the fact that the documents for which
production has been secured may be incriminating. In this instance, the
individual has been compelled to perform a non-testimonial act with in-
criminating potential. Such an act is functionally indistinguishable from
the act of providing a handwriting exemplar or appearing in a line-up;
although either enterprise may very well be attended with incriminating
consequences, the fact that these respective acts are not testimonial in
nature removes them from the protections of the privilege. 384
379 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411 (quoting In re Harris, 211 U.S. 274, 279 (1911)).
This analysis illustrates the indefensibility of the position taken in United States v. Browne. See
supra notes 198-217 and accompanying text. The Browne court, of course, found that production
was not defeated by the fact that foreign bank secrecy laws arguably create a privacy interest in
deposits residing in accounts located in those jurisdictions. The court decided that this interest must
yield to those of the United States in law enforcement. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
The error of this approach, which rejected an aspect of the "but for" standard, is that it predicated
the "but for" analysis upon the existence of foreign secrecy laws rather than upon the extent to
which the "existence and location" of the documents is a "foregone conclusion." The latter predi-
cate is, of course, appropriate under Fisher. The Browne court appears to have believed that "in-
crimination" was somehow dependent upon, or associated with, an enforceable privacy interest
under U.S. law, rather than being a function of the extent to which production will add to the "sum
total" of the government's knowledge. For this reason, therefore, the Browne opinion errs with
regard to its analysis of the "but for" consequences of a particular production.
380 See supra pt. IV(A)(1).
381 In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1276 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See supra pt. IV(A)(1).
382 In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d at 1276 n.5.
383 Texas Doe, 599 F. Supp. at 748.
384 See supra pt. IV(A).
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COMPELLED CONSENT
If, however, an individual is required to execute a consent directive
authorizing the production of documents and the "existence and loca-
tion" of those documents is not a "foregone conclusion," then the execu-
tion of that directive does add "to the sum total of the Government's
information" and is, therefore, a testimonial communication within the
meaning of the fifth amendment. In this context, the individual is being
compelled to perform a testimonial act that may be incriminating. 5
The Fisher approach must be taken in determining whether the execution
of a particular "compelled consent" is a testimonial act within the com-
pass of the fifth amendment; whether the "existence and location" of the
documents for which production is sought a "foregone conclusion"? In
resolving this inquiry, "the burdens of production and proof on the ques-
tions of the existence, possession, and authenticity of the summoned doc-
uments are on the Government."38 6 This means that the government
will be required to come forth with evidence establishing that it has,
"produce[d] .. .evidence ... by its own independent labors. ' 387 The
court should require execution of the consent only if the government is
able to establish that the "existence and location" of the documents for
which production is sought is a "foregone conclusion" within the mean-
ing of Fisher. To do otherwise is to sanction government "fishing expedi-
385 The resolution which is presented above is derived, at least in part, from a simple parsing of
the variables which are involved in a fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination calculus.
The privilege applies whenever three variables are present, i.e., a compelled testimonial communica-
tion with incriminating consequences. These variables then give rise to the eight logical possibilities:
(1) A compelled testimonial communication with incriminating consequences, such as the ex-
ecution of a consent directive whenever the "existence and location" of the documents sought
therein is not a "foregone conclusion"; the privilege applies.
(2) A compelled non-testimonial act with incriminating consequences, such as the execution
of a consent directive whenever the "existence and location" of the documents sought therein is a
"foregone conclusion"; the privilege does not apply.
(3) A compelled non-testimonial act without incriminating consequences; the privilege does
not apply.
(4) A compelled testimonial communication without incriminating consequences; the privi-
lege does not apply.
(5) A non-compelled testimonial communication with incriminating consequences; the privi-
lege does not apply, for reasons which appear in the Neville opinions.
(6) A non-compelled non-testimonial communication with incriminating consequences; the
privilege does not apply.
(7) A non-compelled testimonial communication without incriminating consequences; the
privilege does not apply.
(8) A non-compelled non-testimonial communication with incriminating consequences; the
privilege does not apply.
386 United States v. Rue, 819 F.2d 1488, 1493 n.4 (8th Cir. 1987) (enunciating the standard
which is to be used in determining whether the fifth amendment prohibits the enforcement of an IRS
Summons). See supra pt. IV(A)(1).
387 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 762 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
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tions" which directly contravene the letter and spirit of the privilege
which is embodied in the fifth amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has proposed an analysis of the extent to which the
execution of consent directives, or "compelled consents" is an act which
is encompassed by the protections of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Part I described the factual context from
which this issue has arisen, while part II considered select issues in the
law of extra-territorial discovery in criminal proceedings. Part III ex-
amined the decisional law With respect to the use of such consents, while
part IV proposed an analysis for determining when their execution is,
indeed, encompassed by the protections of the fifth amendment.t
t This article was completed prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Doe v. United States, 108
S. Ct. 2341 (1988). The Doe opinion is discussed in the Paget-Brown article supra, at notes 100-13.
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